This article is part of a series examining Rwanda’s progress and challenges in the twenty years since the 1994 genocide. Through the eyes of several experts, This Is Africa examines this legacy to commemorate the 20th anniversary of these terrible events.

After decades of divisive ethnic politics, civil war, and, finally, the genocide in 1994-1995, Rwanda returned to the path of sustainable development. Under the leadership of President Paul Kagame, Rwanda is now regarded as a country with relatively low levels of corruption, improving political stability, and an increasing capacity for generating sustainable development.

Since 2004, it experienced high growth rates exceeding 7 percent, with the exception of a dip in 2009. This, coupled with Rwanda’s close relationship with Western donors over the decades since the genocide, led to it being dubbed one of the “aid darlings” by the Economist.

How could Rwanda realise such a shift in such a short period of time? After the genocide, the Rwandan transitional government took a series of measures to re-establish national unity and foster ethnic reconciliation. Most importantly, in 1999, the economic development plan Vision 2020 was put in place to spearhead the country’s goals in support of the political transition. The plan envisaged an economic transformation that would move Rwanda from an agrarian to a knowledge-based economy by 2020. The key objectives were to modernise the agricultural sector in the medium term, and to develop the private sector and create an entrepreneurial middle class in the long term, which would ultimately transform Rwanda into a middle-income country. Under Vision 2020, and with patient international support, Rwanda has achieved tremendous progress both politically and economically in the past 20 years.

While most analysts attribute the success to good leadership, I argue that the key lies in the country’s ability to achieve a clever balance of the security-development nexus. Security and development are preconditions for one another, not a linear relationship. However, orthodox approaches to addressing this nexus put more emphasis on peace based on the logic, to quote former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, that “there will be no development without security”. However, the Rwandan government also keeps the inverse of Mr Annan’s words in mind: “and no security without development”.

This kind of thinking is why Vision 2020 was carried forward even as Rwanda was still considered to be in political transition in 1999. Now, Rwanda’s rapid recovery has led to optimistic talk of it becoming a beacon of development – perhaps even comparable to an Asian hub such as Singapore – by 2020. If one looks back to China’s development over the past three decades, similarities between the two development paths emerge.

By the end of 1970s, China was standing on the edge of state bankruptcy, similar to Rwanda in 1994 and worse than most contemporary “fragile” African states. Shortly after stabilisation, in 1979 China launched the opening up and reform policies that set the stage for the country’s rise two decades later, premised on an an approach to the security-development nexus that Chinese scholars named “Developmental Peace”. Through this lens, many similarities can be found when comparing the development paths pursued by both countries.

Such resonance endows both parties with many opportunities for cooperation, as well as a common understanding of governance. The trade volume between Rwanda and China has increased forty-fold, from $4m in 1998 to $161m in 2012, and while there have been ups and downs, Rwanda has enjoyed a surplus in most years. Meanwhile, Chinese aid to Rwanda from 1971 until 2010 totals approximately RMB1bn (around $165m), composed of 49 percent ($81m) in grants, 32 percent ($53m) in zero-interest loans and 19 percent ($31m) in preferential loans. More importantly, such resonance between the two nation’s chosen development paths makes the Rwandan government and ruling party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, very keen to learn from China about effective but not necessarily “good governance” experience.

In the two-way process that is the security-development nexus, both Rwanda and China should keep in mind that economic development solves many but not all problems. In a 2009 interview, President Paul Kagame claimed that “the European and the American commitment didn’t help on Africa”, while arguing that “the Chinese bring along what Africa needs: investments. China invests in infrastructure, like building roads. The human rights concern shouldn’t be an excuse for capital not to be mobilised.” However with rising domestic turmoil at home, China is now opening a new chapter of deepening all-around reforms, among them high priority political reforms. More resonances may emerge from future calls for the next chapter in Rwanda’s national reconciliation, recovery, and rise.

Source of documents：thisisafricaonline.com