Shinzo Abe's pilgrimage to Yasukuni Shrine on December 26 angered Japan's neighbors, especially China and South Korea. The rightward shift in Japanese politics is the primary cause of Abe's shameful behavior, but U.S. policy towards Japan, on historical issues in particular, must take some of the blame.

It is true that the U.S. is not entirely uncritical of Japan's attitude. Shortly after Abe visited the shrine, the U.S. embassy in Japan issued a statement saying that the United States was disappointed that Japan's leadership had taken an action that would exacerbate tensions with its neighbors.

Furthermore, during a visit to Japan in October 2013, John Kerry and Chuck Hagel paid an unexpected visit to Chidorigafuchi, a cemetery containing the remains of unidentified Japanese soldiers who died in World War II. Unlike the nearby Yasukuni Shrine, Chidorigafuchi is considered neutral political ground. The clear purpose of Kerry and Hagel's visit was to send a signal to Japanese politicians that they should not stir up war-related anger in East Asia by visiting Yasukuni.

But was this enough? Absolutely not. Let us take a look at what the U.S. has done in other similar cases. The atrocities that the Nazis and Japanese militarists committed in the 1930s and 1940s were similar in scope and nature. Millions of Europeans, Jews in particular, were slaughtered by the Nazis, while the Japanese killed millions of Chinese and Koreans. Neither of these truths, which form the cornerstone of the post-war world order, should be denied. Any denial or dilution of the facts should be regarded as an offense against humanity, against justice, and a challenge to the postwar order.

But unfortunately, U.S. responses to denials in each case have been quite different. The famous 2005 Holocaust-denying speech by former Iranian president Ahmedinejad was strongly condemned in the U.S. media and academia, and the U.S. Congress passed bill No. S.RES.337.ATS entitled "To condemn the harmful, destructive, and anti-Semitic statements of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the President of Iran, and to demand an apology for those statements of hate and animosity towards..."

The U.S. was certainly right to condemn Ahmedinejad's irresponsible speech. But the question is: Why is it unwilling to respond with the same degree of firmness to the same kind of denial of history in another part of the world? The pilgrimage of Abe and other Japanese politicians to Yasukuni is an even more serious act than simply denying past aggression. The Yasukuni Shrine is the spiritual home of Japanese militarism and was formerly used by the militarists to mobilize support for their wars of aggression. Visiting Yasukuni not only amounts to a denial of Japan's history of aggression, but also implies admiration for the militarism that inspired that history.

What is more, Yasukuni contains the remains of 14 Class A war criminals, including those of Hideki Tojo, widely regarded as the Japanese equivalent of Adolf Hitler.

A comparison with the reactions of China and other countries to the 911 atrocity committed against the U.S. also highlights the inadequacies of the U.S. position. Following 911, Chinese leaders sent condolences to the U.S. president, and strongly condemned the terrorist attack. Even leaders of Muslim countries sent condolences and expressed strong condemnations. Furthermore, China and other countries offered to assist the U.S. in its war against terrorism.

But the weak U.S. response to the Yasukuni visits is not the full story. U.S. indulgence, in some respects, actually encourages Japan to engage in this kind of behavior. This happens not only at official level but also at various other secondary levels. The latest example was U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel's visit to Japan this October during which, along with his Australian counterpart, he signed a joint statement with Japan's Minister of Defense. Whatever other purpose this statement might serve, it will certainly encourage Japan to adopt more aggressive positions on historical and other issues.

In a recent personal conversation, a leading U.S. scholar of East Asian studies based in Washington DC expressed his impatience with Chinese scholars who refer to historical issues at international conferences. He insisted that Chinese scholars should spend more time discussing other more "substantial" issues. But how can China not talk about historical issues when Japan's politicians persist in picking at what are still open sores?

Another leading U.S. scholar praised Japan as a good guy who abides by international rules, in an October speech to the Center for Strategic Studies, disregarding entirely Japan's frequent challenges to the post-WWII international consensus. She also chided the Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. for his legitimate criticism of Japan's positions on historical issues.

Some U.S. scholars believe that the Chinese people's views on historical issues are colored by anti-Japanese propaganda in Chinese movies and TV series. But does a history that claimed tens of millions of victims need propaganda to be widely known and remembered? In the Pentagon Memorial for the victims of 911, there is an inscription - stressed by being given a separate line - "we never forget." Why should the Chinese forget their bitter history?

The U.S. no doubt has its own reasons for adopting a wrong position on this matter. But its incorrect stance is detrimental to U.S. interests and its image as a responsible global leader, and will become more so over time.

The U.S. currently sees Japan as an ally balancing against China, even though it was China that fought shoulder to shoulder with America in World War Two. It is ironic that the same group of militarist leaders who are presently enshrined at Yasukuni made the decision to attack Pearl Harbor. It is not known what the dead of Pearl Harbor would think of the positions of the current U.S. government and, particularly, its weak response to Abe's Yasukuni pilgrimage.

We are not discussing here whether it is reasonable for the U.S. to regard China as a threat that must be balanced against, but rather whether values are more or less important than strategic interests. The historical issues raise very clearly the question of what is right and what is wrong. Even if the U.S. is right to regard China as a strategic rival, it should not abandon its values, and should not obscure the distinction between right and wrong.

The U.S. is not only a nation state with advanced values but also a global leader. If the U.S. cannot stick to its values, why should other countries look to it as a model? To put it another way, if the U.S. continues to refuse to take a clear stance on historical issues, it will lose the trust not only of China and South Korea, but also of other nations.

The weak U.S. position is also unlikely to prevent a buildup of tensions between China and Japan. It is often argued that the best interests of the U.S. in East Asia lie in smoothing tensions between the two major regional powers. But, as we have seen above, U.S. indulgence risks encouraging Japan to take aggressive measures which, in turn, will leave China with very little room for maneuver, since China's policy on this matter is not very flexible. Does the U.S. really want to risk a conflict between China and Japan that might end with the U.S. being dragged into a war that would benefit nobody?

Source of documents：China.org.cn