Key Points

The relationship among China, India, and the United States is not yet a strategic triangle, but a trilateral one.

The United States wants to use India to balance China’s rise.

India will act as a swing state in the global balance of power, particularly in the China-India-US equation.

In the future, China needs a comprehensive policy for India or a new policy for a harmonious Asia.

Summary

As the two biggest emerging powers, the rise of both China and India has drawn close attention from the rest of the world, especially from the United States, currently the dominant power in the international system. The United States is concerned, not only with the speed of growth in China and India, but also the development of relations between the two. Due to the relative decline in its own power after the Iraq War, the United States is very concerned about challenges from emerging powers. There is no doubt that, from the perspective of the United States, China is the biggest challenger among them. According to its experiences from the Cold War era, a triangular strategy is suitable for the United States in this situation and it is very skilful in playing such a game.

Analysis

About six years ago, Seema Sirohi, a Washington-based correspondent and an Indian living abroad, compared the relationship between the United States, India and China with a romantic triangle, in which each country tries to benefit from the tensions between the other two. If the relationship between India and China deteriorates, the United States will benefit and enjoy curry and Peking duck in the same meal. Will the United States be able to maintain its advantageous position and benefit from the tensions between China and India? To answer that question we need to analyse several different aspects of their relations. Characterising the relationships between China, India and the United States as a romantic triangle, however, could be too simple. Those relationships are much more complicated than that.

A Strategic Triangle or a Trilateral Relationship?

According to triangular relationship theories, several requirements should be satisfied to establish a strategic triangle relationship: First, the three parties forming the triangle are global or regional powers, with high status in the international system. Second, the development of each party’s national power is different in its direction or speed, which results in the different perceptions of their national interest, especially in terms of national security. Third, each party has a different attitude to the other two parties. Factors affecting their attitudes to one another include history, ideology, political system and culture. Fourth, each bilateral relationship has overt or covert influences on the third party, resulting in reciprocal checks and balances among the three parties.

Bearing in mind the above-mentioned requirements, in the case of the China-India-US triangle, the United States is the only global superpower; China and India are regional powers. Therefore, the first requirement is satisfied. China’s rapid economic development, and its rising political influence over the past decade, worry both the United States and India; they definitely feel the pressure from China. China and India had a conflict over border disputes in 1962. Since then, India has regarded China as one of its biggest threats. The United States is the largest capitalist country in the world and China is the largest communist country, while India regards itself as the largest democracy in the world. Thus, on the ideology front, Americans see India as their natural ally.

Although the first three requirements of a strategic triangle are met, we cannot say that, between China, India, and the US, each bilateral relationship has significant effects on the third party. The China-India-US relationship is not like the China-Soviet-US strategic triangle formed during the Cold War, because, at that time, both the Sino-Soviet and Soviet-American bilateral relationships were actually in situations of cold or hot military confrontation. A change in any one of the bilateral relationships would have had a material influence on the national security or national economic interest of the third party.

The China-India-US triangle is, however, no copy of the China-Soviet-US strategic triangle. The reason is that each of the bilateral relationships has only weak implications for the third party. For a long time, the core issue between China and the United States has been the Taiwan issue, but India has no interest in Taiwan. Now, though, with more and more global issues intruding on the bilateral relations of China and the United States, some of India’s national interests have also become involved.

As for China-India relations, the most important aspects are the border problem, Sino-Pakistani relations and the Dalai Lama issue; but these issues only have indirect connections with the United States.

In Indo-US relations, the focuses are nuclear co-operation and anti-terrorism. The India-US nuclear agreement drew some attention from China, because India claimed that it tested nuclear weapons to protect itself from the so-called China threat in 1998. The India-US nuclear agreement, however, is only a small part of the interest taken by China in Indo-US relations.

If there is any significant connection among the three countries, it is that both China and India take their relationship with the United States as the most important in their external affairs. But it is obvious that there is no evident linkage mechanism among the three bilateral relationships. Thus, we can say that the relationship between China, India and the United States has some characteristics of a strategic triangle, but is, in essence, more a trilateral relationship.

US Strategies in China-India-US Relations

As the only superpower, it is undeniable that the United States enjoys some advantages in China-India-US relations. Both China and India want to maintain a good relationship with the United States, as the only superpower, because both of them are trying to avoid becoming contained by US policies. At the same time, both China and India want to gain some support from the US. This might be where Seema Sirohi’s ‘romantic triangle’ comes from. But, in the current trilateral relationship between China, India and the US, China’s rapid rise has provoked concern and even xenophobic sentiments in the United States.

India’s rise, however, has not worried Americans so much, although, like China, it is regarded by Western countries as another key emerging power. It is evident that the United States wants to use India to balance China’s rise and may possibly even cause conflict between the two countries. This policy was adopted during the Bush Administration, when then US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, announced Washington’s decision to ‘make India a global power’. At first, President Obama did not rate India as highly as President Bush, which caused dissatisfaction and concern in India; but this has not stopped the United States from seeking to create gaps between China and India.

When President Obama paid his first state visit to China, the two countries issued a joint statement, which declared that the United States and China ‘welcomed all efforts conducive to peace, stability and development in South Asia … and support the improvement and growth of relations between India and Pakistan. The two sides are ready to strengthen communication, dialogue and co-operation on issues related to South Asia and work together to promote peace, stability and development in that region.’

The declaration made many Indian people, including Prime Minister Singh, angry, and heightened India’s jealousy of China. Prime Minister Singh calmed down, however, after being given the red carpet treatment when he visited the United States. The US then held the first Strategic Dialogue with India in Washington in 2010 to demonstrate its respect; this immediately followed the China-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing. With these moves, the United States successfully provoked discord between China and India.

India: The Swing State in the Global Balance of Power

Will India become an ally of the United States and balance China, as Americans hope? Maybe not! Today, China’s GDP is about three times as high as India’s. As a neighbouring country, India has a certain jealousy of China. Such an emotion was even hinted at by Prime Minister Singh in his statement that ‘democracies have a far better chance of sustaining economic reform than one-party states’, made before the 2009 G-20 Summit in London.

For India’s military, the growth of China’s military power causes big headaches; although the main aim of China’s military build-up is not India. It is obvious that the 1962 border conflict left India with nightmares. Also, by emphasising an immediate threat from China, India’s army, navy and air force can get enough money from the parliament. India’s jealousy and fear of China is exaggerated by its mass media. To boost ratings, the media frequently reports “military invasions” by the Chinese Army and economic or political competition between China and India. Also, the Indian Government sometimes feels it necessary to demonstrate to the United States its usefulness as a counter to China, all of which makes ordinary people think that the relationship between China and India is very strained.

In fact, India understands well that, instead of taking sides, it is better to be a swing state in the global balance of power, particularly in the China-India-US equation. Several factors help India make such a choice: first, India could take a free position in the grand game between China and the United States, if that game were to take place someday, and India could gain benefits from both sides. Second, India has a tradition of nonalignment. Third, India has some bad memories from its own past experiences of co-operation with the United States, and is afraid of being fooled. Last, and maybe most importantly, India and China have a very large common interest; that is, both countries need a peaceful and stable periphery to allow them to peacefully emerge as world powers and develop smoothly.

China and India also have a lot of common interests, for example: in the multi-polarisation of the international structure; reform of the international financial system; and climate change. Their co-operation in these fields may not be welcomed by the United States.

What Does it Mean for China?

In the short to medium terms, China may not need to worry that India could forge an alliance with the United States as a check and balance on China. In the long run, however, it is still too early to draw any conclusions. For a long time, China has not taken India seriously, and most Chinese do not regard India as a world power. But, with India’s continuing economic development, China-India relations may become the most important bilateral relations in Asia in the next twenty years. India wants a multipolar world and a multipolar Asia. China also wants a multipolar world, but Beijing has a different perception when it comes to Asia. How to deal with the rise of India? This is an important question for China. China may need a comprehensive policy for India, or a new policy for a harmonious Asia in which it can share interests and responsibilities with other Asian powers.

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