The overseas national interest is a new concept in China’s political dictionary, emerging along with a dramatic expansion in overseas natural resource exploration to meet China’s rapidly growing economy. This paper focuses on China’s evolving overseas national interests and the potential threats to those interests posed by international factors in and beyond Asia Pacific. It discusses China's foreign policy responding to the new challenges and its diplomacy’s options to address those difficulties. Finally it explores possible scenarios for China’s diplomatic strategy but the author’s argument is that competitive cooperation is a way for China to adopt.

I. Definition of the Chinese Overseas National Interests

Like China’s traditional concept that diplomacy is the extension of domestic politics, the concept of Chinese overseas national interests is considered as the continuation of domestic policy by diplomatic means and serving for domestic development. Since the debate over China’s core national interests over South China Sea early 2010,[①] the principles of the core interests in Chinese foreign policy have essentially had two clarifications.

The first came from China’s State Councilor Dai Bingguo who states that "core national interests" can be referred to those in three categories: China’s political system under the leadership of Chinese Communist Party, sovereignty security and territorial integrity including national unification and the sustainable development of Chinese economy.[②] This expression clarifies for a first time the Chinese position on the core national interests. This author uses the “first time” because the official documents since Mao Zedong era had only expressed class interests and national interests but not an academic concept of core national interest. The term “core national interests” should have been borrowed from the American literatures but described as the concept “vital interests” introduced to China early this century.[③]

The concept of the core national interests has undergone some change in a government document nearly one year after Dai Bingguo. It states that China’s core national interests cover six fields such as state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, China's political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development.[④] Some scholarly studies have examined the differences and tried to provide insight into the change. The new document still places China’s political system in its core national interests but does not use the word the leadership of Chinese Communist Party as well as the priority sequences changed. In addition, the document is issued as a Chinese government document but the previous Dai’s essay published on his personal capacity. Both clarifications, however, have only stated the principles and basic concepts but not adequately addressed what China’s overseas national interests are specifically included. President Hu Jintao in a speech delivered to Chinese diplomats in August 2004 referred to the overseas interests for diplomatic work as “to maintain and expand our country’s national interests”,[⑤] but did not state in detail what China’s diplomatic strategy and policy should be conducted to maintain and expand those interests.

The academic research and debate over Chinese overseas national interests have mostly paid their attentions to raw resources China seeks, particularly, the oil China has been purchasing. Ever since China imported oil for the first time in 1993 China has indeed made huge efforts to seek energy to support internal development but even greater quantities of imported oil can only be attributed to one of China’s overseas interests. As a matter of the fact, China’s overseas interests are divided into the following aspects: national political interests; national business interests; and overseas Chinese citizens’ interests. Politically, the concept of Chinese overseas interests must reflect Beijing’s policy guidance that advances its domestic core national interests, among which the first and most important is to maintain the Party’s ruling status and the socialist political system. These interests are closely connected with China’s external political environments, political status, political role at the political stage of world and in the process of building international order. As a rising power to seek political influence and attraction, China, standing in side with other emerging economies, has been playing a constructive role in building new international institutions such as BRICS and G20. Only being accepted by other countries, big or small, remote or proximal, can China become a political power. Such a globally accepted status will be beneficial to consolidating the Party’s rule status in Beijing. Besides, China needs to unify its territory. China is not a unified nation now for China’s international political role as a big power is not as strong as other big powers’, though China is making every effort to work for its unification. As the overseas environments are so complex and volatile that no planner or policy maker can accurately predict sudden changes and incidents, overseas political interests sometimes are hard to handle. The incidents such as China’s embassy blast and naval ships being stalked are reflecting the evidence that China’s political and security interests beyond China’s border are insecure and unsafe.  

Economically, China’s external interests contain commercial and business interests. Since the early 1980s, China has carried out the new policy of opening-up to the world and now the external economic interests have been essential to China’s domestic development. The overseas economic interests are basically consisted of export trade, importing raw materials, international investment, overseas’ tourism, and Chinese labors serving overseas. All these can be classified into seeking overseas markets, meeting internal demand for energy and pursuing regional and global investment returns. China’s financial facilities in the US should be safely ensured and China’s banks’ branches must have the right to normally operate although the U.S. sanctions against Iran have been effective. The Chinese dramatic growth triggers a strong demand for energy. For a long time China has been self sufficient in energy for internal development although China is a big country in oil and coal consumption. Since China became a net importer of oil in 1993 and exceeded Japan in oil consuming in 2003, China became the second oil consumer next to the United States. Chinese depending on importing oil has been heavier and China is confronting the challenge from energy security. Indeed, China has sought oil all over the world and overseas energy interests become obvious and this trend cannot be interrupted but continues. The personal safety and human security have become part of China’s overseas interests. Individuals who are working outside China have the right to ask government to protect them from any offensive attacks. Nowadays, the issue whether Chinese citizens are treated fairly or not is regarded not only as an issue of Chinese society but also a window for China to be observed in respect or not. Beijing should bear the responsibility to take care of Chinese citizens and nationals, in particular, those who hold Chinese passports are working and traveling as tourists in the world. Their safety and normal activities become parts of China’s overseas interests. Put it simply, China’s overseas interests contain those interests in politics, economy, human security, as well as culture. In principle, they are the continuation of its internal core national interests. However, all these interests are served as additional function, not a vital factor to China’s core national interests because all external environments are not under control of central authorities in Beijing and the core national interests must be within border lines.

II. What Are the Potential Threats to China’s Overseas Interests?

Concern about China’s overseas interests’ safety and security persist in China beginning from almost ten years ago when China initiated its new policy “going-out” strategy despite diplomatic achievements were repeated and China’s relations with the United States had warmed up since the EP-3 incident in April 2001. The first two or three decades of the new century are expected to be not only a new opportunity period for peace and development but also a complicated, contradiction-ridden and even turbulent and changeable one. One of the potential threats to China’s overseas’ political and security interests is the political rhetoric from Western critics that China is a rising power, though becomes increasingly incredulous and sometimes assertive. Regional instability and global tensions arising from territorial disputes and traditional thinking against communism are threatening stability around China’s border, in particular, in East Asia waters and tossing mud at China’s quiet, humble and friendly image although China is not a communist style of former Soviet Union. China is not a threat but depicted as seemingly a Voldemort to Asia security as well as the U.S. navy although China tries to make best contributions to global peace and security. China, like any other country, makes efforts to develop weapons systems and even deploys a newly developed missile, which could be fired from land but labeled as an “anti-access”, “access-denial” or “A2/AD” strategy, seemingly threatening the American ships. The menacing rhetoric by some of American hawks only serves as a counter-productive role. Some remarks and the current American forces being enhancing and retooling deliberately to confront China are clearly threatening China’s role to play at regional and global stages. It is hard to persuade China not to prepare for and protect a sudden attack from a distance area in Pacific. The assertive remarks by Chinese foreign minister at ARF on July 23, 2010 must have been supported by all over the country. No one would like to see China’s overseas political and security interests threatened. Those interests should be respected and maintained not only by China but the United States as well. Political threats also come from international terrorism including Islamic fundamentalism and Pan-Turkism. China’s internal stability has been threatened by separatists supported by those elements who have some unrealistic aspirations for western China's Muslim minorities, particularly in the autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Ningxia. Increasingly, China’s experts on political and security threats have warned that the North Korea’s nuclear proliferation has special destabilizing implications on China as well as the West Pacific. The argument shares the American and other Western countries’ concerns including Japan’s. However, Japan is not welcome by China because it harbors hostile intentions against China and is increasingly encouraged by the United States to play a rival role. Although outside China Japan is regarded as a charming and peaceful country because of its Constitution, most Chinese are still in a fear and horror that Japan will resume its process towards a militarist power.

Maintaining overseas economic interests is the second challenge to China in the next decade or more. Economic interests have now occupied a significant position in the process of China’s evolving overseas interests because they are the material foundation and pillar of the comprehensive national interests. Economic force has a very close relation not only with overseas political role but also with military influence. New military revolution lies on the strong economy and a strong military force also needs a strong foundation of economy. These days China’s evolving overseas interests have been focused on and watched mainly because of the fact that China’s economic growth has been faster than others. To have a sustainable development, China needs to ensure the safety of sea lanes and freedom of navigation. China now is the second-largest economy and the trade power in the world. China’s rapid growth now heavily depends on trade for raw materials, especially oil to sustain China’s economy. Safety of sea lanes and communication are vital to ship China exports and imports outbound and inbound and any disruption of the sea lanes and some significant straits like Malacca and Singapore Straits and the Strait of Hormuz, the most strategic chokepoints lie in the Indian Ocean region, will be vital to China’s economy for the next decades. Any country like Iran can seal off the Strait of Hormuz but undoubtedly it will wreak havoc on China but also a serious attack on world oil markets.

The third is connected with Ocean commerce, also a significant factor with the above sea lane issue. Ocean commerce actually has now occupied a huge part of China’s GDP, becoming essential to China’s economy but China does not have enough capability to protect China’s seaborne commerce. Actually, China did and will continue meeting complex and hostile overseas environments. Piracy will be a threat, which can be protected against because it becomes a common target in the world. But some activities conducted by India and Japan are always some kind of anxiety because Chinese ships, commercial and naval, are stalked in Western Pacific and India Ocean, economic life lines for China. The Philippines is increasingly becoming a question country but is supported by the United States to deliberate provocative actions against China and set up some special stations monitoring China’s ships, which are not tolerable but China has to tolerate. The Philippines and other small countries’ provocative actions help the United States watch China but a threat to China’s ocean commercial interests.

Fourth, the overseas threats to China will come from its increasing investments abroad. As China is a newcomer, China cannot find preferable places to invest but assumes huge risks. Many locations are in the environments chaotic and instable and any sudden change and upheaval can erupt in an unexpected situation. The Libya revolt, for instance, erupted in early 2011 was a sudden event not only developed into a popular revolution and finally overthrew Kaddafi’s regime, but also a disaster to China’s investment and other assets. Iran is another risky location for China’s investment in oil fields. It seems China’s oil companies are desperate to do business there but the future is indeed very attractive for them. As a matter of fact, China is now experiencing a huge loss in Iran because of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, a new sanction over Iran also impacts other countries’ financial institutions and branches including these banks’ operations in the United States. According to China’s official statistics, China imported around $29b worth oil from Iran in 2010 and over 100 Chinese companies invested in Iran with contracting total amount of around $120b.[⑥] It is estimated that China will double its oil imports in the next decade for internal demand and therefore how to overcome unexpected threats overseas is a big problem. Probably China lacks experience in investment and acquisition beyond its own border and the loss seems huge and one of the researches indicates that almost half of China’s overseas acquisition failed.[⑦] As China does not have enough capability to maintain its overseas interests, China’s interests abroad in politics, economy and other areas are inclined to be in danger. Objectively, in the process of globalization, the difficulties in coordinating the national political, security interests with commercial interests have been harder to overcome. International crisis in finance accumulated more difficulties that intensify the political and commercial competitions among countries, particularly, between emerging economies and developed economies. In some China’s experts’ eyes, the United States as a declining power seems obsessed with some kind of envy feelings and will put up their final ditch struggle for survival. They have argued that the final struggle made by an injured tiger will be more fearful and more threatening although others have different points of view regarding the United States as a benign empire ever existed in history. The ten-year fight against terrorism and the 2008 financial crisis have had an adverse effect on the American economy but its hard power, military strength, meets no real rival and its soft power will be strong enough to attract many countries. At least to maintain a peaceful competition will be benefiting China and all other economies.

The new China (PRC) has existed for over sixty years and China’s national interests have experienced the stages such as protecting the Beijing rule, ensuring the whole country’s security and maintaining the economic development. In the near future, a decade or more, China will go on a process of dramatic growth. For the purpose not to slow down the economic growth, China needs a good strategic environment external and internal to ensure the China’s national interests safe and secure. China will meet challenges and difficulties that will threaten China’s national interests. If China cannot handle well, China will have some possibility that its economy stands still and even meets some unexpected crisis, which will harm china’s interests and make its future unclear. This is not a result we want to see.

III. China’s Response to Those Challenges

With China’s rise, China’s overseas interests are and will be evolving. China’s foreign policy must be adjusting with the new situation and new historic missions for the evolving national interests. China seems to be an influential country capable to be a regional and global power but China is still vulnerable, given its physical position confronting the Pacific Ocean and the factor that China’s territory is still divided by the Taiwan Strait. Obviously, at least next decade is an important period for China’s foreign policy and diplomatic strategy but China faces challenges. How does China’s diplomacy respond?

First, China’s diplomacy will strictly follow the Party’s strategy. The ruling party Chinese Communist Party is about to celebrate its 100-year anniversary and that will be a significant event for China’s diplomacy to mark the centenary of the founding of the Communist Party of China because it will reflect how China’s diplomacy serves for enhancing the ruling status of the Party. China’s diplomacy will certainly follow the Party’s guidance for peaceful development.

Second, China’s diplomacy must keep a close pace with internal development and needs to consider how to serve internal reform and opening up, particularly to ensure development interests, building a moderately prosperous society in all respects. China is quickly developing and having some recorded achievements but China’s diplomacy should keep moderate and humble. China still has a long way to go to catch up with the level the United States and other Western countries.

Third, internationally, it is a trend that international architecture will change continually and China’s diplomacy must consider how to play some constructive role in the changing architecture for protecting Chinese national interests external and internal. China will persist in the judgment that the world is undergoing profound and complex changes and peace, development and cooperation have gathered momentum. These principles will be the basic guidance for China to consider how to make the foreign policy serve its evolving overseas interests as well as its internal interests. As a rising country, China will meet competition and pressure from current hegemon who will take any method to stop China’s expansion for its national interests although China hears many friendly remarks from the United States. To deal with those threats and serve China’s development interests, China possibly has some scenarios for its diplomatic strategy but final decision will be depending on and draw the wisdom of China’s new leadership.

The first is to continue the free ride strategy. China has obtained a lot from the free rider approach during the last thirty years and can keep the way forward for maximizing its overseas interests. This way will want China to go further in cooperation with the United States and Western states. The advantage is that China will not become a rival and even an enemy to the United States and China will meet less resistance from outside in its modernization process. The disadvantage is that the free rider way will ask China to make some concessions in the areas of China’s core interests and overseas interests. This is a land power and historically it has been hard for a land power to become a sea power successfully (Andrew Ericson). China, therefore, will pay some prices for the support and protection from the Western countries including the United States. The cost and effect will affect China’s decision.

The second is to take a peaceful competition approach through a smart diplomacy for China’s power status in the future. This is a stronger way than the previous one but still advocates peaceful way because peaceful way does not mean without competition and conflicts. China has its nation’s merits and so do others’. How to use the merits is an art for its country’s interests. These merits must be used through fair competition for purpose to find opportunities for further cooperation and to improve the way for each other to realize their national interests. This is what we call the common interests not only for China but also for other countries.

The third is to support military way. Some mistook Hu’s historic mission remark[⑧] as a military preparation for ensuring overseas interests and therefore they advocate the remark that Chinese military should follow the track of Chinese overseas interest’s expansion, which means wherever there are Chinese and Chinese interests, there should be Chinese army at presence. Like any country, China’s military army cannot go anywhere as it wants to go but instead to conduct military diplomacy to improve China’s relations with others. As a matter of fact, military and diplomacy bear the same mission to protect and serve China’s interests. China’s diplomacy should play an important role to support PLA to adhere to pragmatism and cooperation, expand PLA’s participation in regional and international security cooperation, engage regulation and consultation with major powers and neighboring countries to exchange military activities, enhance maritime escort and other peaceful missions. Given PLA adherence to the principles of being just, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced, standing for effective disarmament and arms control, and endeavoring to maintain global strategic stability, the military strategic thinking is basically consistent with China’s diplomatic thinking. The relationships between PLA(N) and China’s diplomacy are in the different sections of a governmental system but conducting a same purpose for national interests. Sometimes the diplomatic environment constrains the naval operations at sea but sometimes the navy’s operational thinking may have some pressure on diplomacy. Therefore it is important that the military side and diplomatic side must enhance mutual communication and understanding, that is, military side needs to consider the diplomatic situation and the diplomatic section should understand the military thinking for national security. The coordinative and consultative relationships are essential in a peace period because each has its function to realize the mission for a national security.

China’s overseas interests’ expansion is coincident with the China’s rising. China says China’s rising way is a process differing from a traditional pattern in which a rising power is bound to be a hegemony. My personal argument is that if China develops to be in a stage that China is really accepted as a benign power through a peaceful way China will be a superpower. But that is still a long way to go. This will depend on China’s diplomatic strategy to carry out peaceful and smart diplomacy. China’s demand and obtainment for overseas interests will undoubtedly meet resistance not only from the current hegemon but also from an array of countries around the hegemon, no matter who they are, allies, partners or new partners. Therefore, to be a prosperous, developed and wealthy country, China must adhere to be a democratic, harmonious and stable country as a principle and this is also a diplomatic principle and then China will make more contributions to the global peace. To that goal, a peaceful competition is a preferable approach and it can be called a competitive cooperation way.

China consistently states that China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace, independent development. This independent value and approach can be used to predict what appropriate scenario for China to adopt. China, therefore, cannot continue taking the free rider approach because some argument believes that following up approach or taking a free ride at the other’s cars will certainly reduce the freedom of action for China. And they argue that China will be a big power and as a big power China cannot always follow other power for its survival. Besides, following other’s track can only reduce China’s own influence but nothing in return. My argument is that the realistic choice for China’s diplomacy is not to take the free-rider way but the competitive cooperation.  

The nature of the competitive cooperation approach is peaceful but peaceful competition does not mean a way without any dispute and quarrel. The cooperation is competitive and cooperative competition reflects a main stream in the international society for peace-loving expectation and the trend actually is a pressure for any country who tries to resort to military way. Competitive cooperation rejects menace and military way to solve disputes and any country wants to use military method and it will pay more prices for its foolish manner. Peaceful competition is realistic because no big powers like the United States and China would have a resolve to use military force. They understand each other if anyone uses the army and navy, neither side will win but fall into its doom. This has a special meaning for China. Some argument seems that China will confront the United States because China has not been a part of the United States’ alliance and at this point no one can predict and no historical evidence demonstrates a newly emerging land power will take over the global power position by a peaceful way. This viewpoint believes if China will be strong enough to be a superpower the history does not support this replacement through a smiling way. China uses a concept “community of common interests” to indicate that China, U.S. and others are on a same boat rowing to a common goal, which Secretary Clinton repeats too and wishes the two countries must bear historic responsibility for our next generations. The United States also repeats that it will not contain China but wish to see a prosperous and peaceful China arising in East Asia. And recent incident Chen Guangshen case in Beijing has been dealt smoothly and reflected a positive signal that these two countries have the possibility to solve any touchy issues. Peaceful competition as a cooperative approach can be a fundamental approach for both countries to maintain global maritime stability. New leadership and new administration are gradually emerging on the horizon and they will lead each country to navigate to a common goal.

IV. Conclusion

We have seen China’s overseas interests not only include resources exploration but maintain its political interests as well. China’s overseas interests are increasing and face some unexpected threats but they are not vital and probably will not become vital and core interests in a foreseeable future. This is mainly because in nature they are unable for Beijing to control the environment beyond China’s border and Beijing has the policy abiding by the international law but not to use military force to obtain disputed sea areas. In a foreseeable future, China will continue seek resources domestically and globally. It is a fact that because China stays in the current international system, and China may not challenge the international society but observe the current international laws and regulations. To meet China’s demand for overseas resources, China’s foreign policy will not remain unchanged because the concept of national interest is not a fixed attribute. We have several scenarios but competitive cooperation is an approach as a basic way. A cooperative way may be a better way for China to adopt.

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