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Jan 08 2013
The US Pivot Strategy: Implications for East Asia and Latin America
By Jorge Malena
In January this year, the US Dept. of Defense presented a document named "Sustaining the Global US Leadership: Defense Priorities for the 21st Century". This strategic guidance stressed that the economic and security interests of the US are strongly linked to those nations within the arch encompassing from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. Accordingly, the US armed forces will be "rebalanced towards the Asia Pacific region". As an early sign of this move, President Barack Obama announced in November 2011 that 2,500 US marines would be deployed in Australia's Northern territory. It is pretty obvious what that means: to weaken China's capacity to project power in its surrounding area.
On the other hand, China is committed to what it calls a "peaceful rise", which -amongst others-includes a commitment to avoid conflict as a result of its higher profile in international politics. Besides these foreign policy definitions, China's defense budget is less than a quarter the size of America's. In other words, the PRC devotes a bit over 2% of GDP to defense, about the same as Britain and France, and half of what is spent by the US.
At a meeting of South-East Asian nations in 2010, China's foreign minister Yang Jiechi pointed out: "China is a big country, and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact". Accordingly, policymakers in the US and East Asia should concede that a country of China's importance has the right to have a sense of its place in the world, and in so doing it may want to build armed forces which reflect that. What's more, China's Communist Party legitimacy depends on being able to honor its promise of prosperity, so the development of its economy takes precedence over military ambition.
Now turning to the implications to Latin America of the US Pivot strategy, let me remind you that in March 2007 -that is to say four years before Washington launched its "pivot strategy towards Asia"-, Admiral James Stavridis (Commander of US' Southern Command) announced the "Command Strategy for the year 2016". This document highlighted as the main hemispheric challenges Poverty, Corruption, Terrorism and Crime. In order to face these challenges, the US Southern Command proposed to conduct military operations and promote security cooperation.
With regards military operations, it was stated that threats should be countered "close to their source", therefore a "forward defense combined with theater security activities" should be maintained. This reminds us the plan of deploying troops in East Asia that was put forward in the document titled "Sustaining the Global US Leadership: Defense Priorities for the 21st Century". Although there is no clear identification of an actor that threatens American interests, military presence in the remote periphery is advocated.
It should also be noted that the launching in June this year of the "Pacific Alliance" by Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile, might be identified as the "Latin American component" of a broader US "pivot strategy" towards the Pacific Ocean, which contemplates the economic factor. In our view, the Pacific Alliance is an integral part of the Trans Pacific Partnership, which was created in 2005 and includes the US, Peru, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei. Later this year, Mexico, Costa Rica, Canada and Japan have expressed their will to become members.
Due to the lack of time I won't probe into this phenomenon, but I suggest bearing in mind both the Pacific Alliance and the TPP, as economic elements of a strategy designed by Washington that doesn't only involve the military factor.
To sum up, at the time being, both East Asia and Latin America witness one more time Washington's will to pursue its own interests in its periphery, which includes containing China. Perhaps it's time for China and Latin America to further develop a dialogue in strategic and defense issues, to avoid things becoming more awkward and potentially belligerent.
On the other hand, China is committed to what it calls a "peaceful rise", which -amongst others-includes a commitment to avoid conflict as a result of its higher profile in international politics. Besides these foreign policy definitions, China's defense budget is less than a quarter the size of America's. In other words, the PRC devotes a bit over 2% of GDP to defense, about the same as Britain and France, and half of what is spent by the US.
At a meeting of South-East Asian nations in 2010, China's foreign minister Yang Jiechi pointed out: "China is a big country, and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact". Accordingly, policymakers in the US and East Asia should concede that a country of China's importance has the right to have a sense of its place in the world, and in so doing it may want to build armed forces which reflect that. What's more, China's Communist Party legitimacy depends on being able to honor its promise of prosperity, so the development of its economy takes precedence over military ambition.
Now turning to the implications to Latin America of the US Pivot strategy, let me remind you that in March 2007 -that is to say four years before Washington launched its "pivot strategy towards Asia"-, Admiral James Stavridis (Commander of US' Southern Command) announced the "Command Strategy for the year 2016". This document highlighted as the main hemispheric challenges Poverty, Corruption, Terrorism and Crime. In order to face these challenges, the US Southern Command proposed to conduct military operations and promote security cooperation.
With regards military operations, it was stated that threats should be countered "close to their source", therefore a "forward defense combined with theater security activities" should be maintained. This reminds us the plan of deploying troops in East Asia that was put forward in the document titled "Sustaining the Global US Leadership: Defense Priorities for the 21st Century". Although there is no clear identification of an actor that threatens American interests, military presence in the remote periphery is advocated.
It should also be noted that the launching in June this year of the "Pacific Alliance" by Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile, might be identified as the "Latin American component" of a broader US "pivot strategy" towards the Pacific Ocean, which contemplates the economic factor. In our view, the Pacific Alliance is an integral part of the Trans Pacific Partnership, which was created in 2005 and includes the US, Peru, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei. Later this year, Mexico, Costa Rica, Canada and Japan have expressed their will to become members.
Due to the lack of time I won't probe into this phenomenon, but I suggest bearing in mind both the Pacific Alliance and the TPP, as economic elements of a strategy designed by Washington that doesn't only involve the military factor.
To sum up, at the time being, both East Asia and Latin America witness one more time Washington's will to pursue its own interests in its periphery, which includes containing China. Perhaps it's time for China and Latin America to further develop a dialogue in strategic and defense issues, to avoid things becoming more awkward and potentially belligerent.
Source of documents：