China’s application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreementfor Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is prompting domestic and internationaldiscussion. People are asking questions about Beijing’s motivations, theobstacles China must overcome before ascension and the entry requirements itmust meet to gain membership.

图片

China is serious about joining CPTPP. Its application is the consequenceof a long-held policy position. In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping consulted with then US president BarackObama on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)during a visit to the United States. Despite some critics then warning thatfeatures of the TPP were traps China should avoid, China’s Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairsthen implied China was positively considering TPP entry.

The United States did not respond to this enthusiasm positively. The TPPwas a centrepiece of US geopolitical strategy in the Asia Pacific and it wasnatural for the United States to adopt a sceptical attitude towards China’sinclusion in the initial stages of negotiations. An early research report produced by Peter Petri andothers, and delivered by a staff member of the US State Department at aone-and-half track conference at the Peterson International Economics Institutein Washington, was proof of this position: China was to be considered among thelast candidates for TPP entry when the Asian Track, which includedChina, combined with the TPP Track.

Despite this, China has never stopped seeking out FTAs with othercountries, as set out in Xi’s 2014 regional economic strategy the ‘19th GroupStudy of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central CommitteeCalling for Accelerated Fulfillment of the Free Trade Area Strategy’. China’sapplication for CPTPP entry is a new milestone in the context of China’s FTA policy. It is not asurprise but rather an outcome of Xi’s decision to actively consider joiningthe TPP and its successor the CPTPP over the last decade.

China is still confronting some challenges withrespect to core CPTPP articles. One is the forced labour issue and how China isto deal with the labour clause (CPTPP Article 19.2), which requires eliminatingall forms of forced or compulsory labour. As a signatory to the InternationalLabour Organization, it is necessary for China to accept the fundamentalprinciples of labour rights, irrespective of whether it has signed other internationalconventions or not. China’s labour policies do not allow for forced labour. Onedoes hear stories of rights violations, like the cases of child labour in somefactories. But central and provincial government policy prohibits it.

The second thorny issue China must address relates to digital provisions,in particular, forbidding the forced disclosure of source code (Article 14.17).The issue can be analysed at two levels: at the level of government policy andat the level of commercial operations.

The Chinese government, like some signatories, has already adopted somecybersecurity laws that are in principle consistent with internationalstandards. CPTPP rules on source code are mostly consistent with commercialoperations in industries such as banking, healthcare information management,animation and gaming. After China issued regulations on source code some yearsago, international banking organisations invested in China and remain there.

For instance, JPMorgan still operates and has been approved in 2021 tofully own its securities ventures in China. China must be paying attention tocomplaints made by foreign investors because forced disclosure of source codenot only amounts to protectionism but also acts as a stumbling block to China’sCPTPP accession.

Perhaps another vulnerable point is the internet. China might need time tocompletely open the internet window, which it started 25 years ago. But someCPTPP members, like Vietnam, are already inconsistent in theirapplication of relevant rules, requiring that international tech companiesconduct their business in line with restrictive cybersecurity laws.

The biggest obstacle for China is the United States. The United Stateswill continue leveraging its geopolitical influence as it renegotiates CPTPPentry. If the United States were to re-join, the current 11 CPTPP members mayfind it difficult to oppose US revision of CPTPP articles. If the Bidenadministration would like to renegotiate the CPTPP, members are likely towelcome a US return, despite the few hesitations and complaints some membershave.

The risk exists that the United States misjudges China and sees itsapplication as competing for hegemony in the Asia Pacific, despite Xi Jinping’sclaim that China does not seek hegemony. China wants its relationship with theUnited States to return to normal but reconciliation will not be simple.President Biden could use the opportunity of the annual leaders’ meeting of theAsia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in New Zealand in November to welcomeChina’s CPTPP request as well as express US interest in the CPTPP.

If a positive-sum game is played by the two superpowers, China willachieve CPTPP ascension and peaceful competition and cooperation may result aswell. Otherwise, the landscape in the region will remain difficult.

LINK

Source of documents：East Asia Forum， Nov. 3