In a 2014 article titled “China’s Think Tanks in Global Transition”, Chen Kaimin of the China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations said that the “the international status of China’s Think Tanks is not commensurate with the country’s current status”. This article, and others like it,are indicative of a Chinese state policy for comprehensive reforms and development of the country’s Think Tanks to better respond to the needs of all levels of Chinese leadership – municipal, provincial, national and, to a greater degree than ever before, business. Why engage in such efforts at this particular time? The answer is that the complexity of the international environment, coupled with the complexity of governance processes, demand an objective, pragmatic and rational measuring of a sometimes irrational world and a candid exploration of possible solutions. Think Tanks today, to a greater degree than Universities, are emerging as a concentration of talent for analysis, policy formulation and innovation that is vital for the decision makers using their services. Think Tanks, unlike departments of state and other institutions, are free to perform seven services to wise governance:

- To be totally free,or freer, from political considerations in their activities;
- To take advantage of this greater mobility in reaching out to partners for dialogue;
- To be unafraid to challenge orthodoxy, and recommend new and innovative policies to the decision makers;
- To absorb and employ the wisdom and experience of specialists who might for some reason, not be present among the decision makers anymore (retirement, old age, temporary removal), and to maintain their skills for their eventual reemployment;
- To prepare and provide specialized training, at the frontier of knowledge in their fields, to key personnel within state institutions;
- To reject considerations of rhetoric and image in the pursuit of the national interest;
- And, finally, to maintain an undiminished and undistorted view of the world in order to be ready to advise the decision makers.

The following paragraphs present an example of an emerging vision of Think Tanks as valuable actors in themselves in an increasingly complicated system of international relations. In September 2013, the first meeting of Think Tanks from EU, NATO and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States was organized in Bucharest, Romania, by the EURISC Foundation, a Romanian NGO, and the German Marshall Fund’s Black Sea Trust. Relations between States are complicated enough, but the veritable profusion of new regional bodies around the world has generated new layers of complexity and diplomacy, while setting up innumerable opportunities for new misunderstandings. Present from China were a delegation from the China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations and a representative of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences’ Center for SCO Studies.

The justification for this event was the dialogue gap between these organizations and the increasing media portrayal of their relations as being inevitable antagonistic, or at least competitive. The participants, instead, focused on identifying common interests and grounds between the supranational organizations, reasoning that a convergence of interests enables a defusing of tensions and the affirmation of common values. They started from President Xi Jinping’s well known quotation of “three evils” – terrorism, separatism, extremism and worked from there to come up with a list that ended up being quite extensive. Subjects of common interest ended up being the fight against transnational organized crime, especially drug trafficking, the protection of critical infrastructures at regional and global levels, the fight against piracy and other issues. There were also candid discussions about the resources, organizational capacity and political feasibility of tackling these issues and coordinating between the three bodies for this purpose. The participating scholars obtained not only valuable contacts and new insights for research, but also a clear image of the potential for cooperation that they could present to decision makers in NATO, EU and SCO. Based on the reception of the first Think Tank Meeting, a second one is planned in the next few months, with a more clearly defined topic, “The fight against terrorism in the changing security environment”, which will repeat the best features of the first meeting – free discussion, a “thinking the unthinkable” approach and an atmosphere of scholarly debate, free from political posturing.

Events such as these highlight the slow transformation of Think Tanks from purely research and advisory based entities into influential non-state actors. Some have achieved public notoriety in their own right, and their published opinions are given greater weight by the public and decision makers. Others are just as much initiators of policy, as they are researchers and formulators.

Three reasons stand out for this development:

The first is that now, more than ever, there is a “revolving door” between Think Tanks and the beneficiaries of their services, especially governments. This model is more and more prevalent in the West, meaning that a Think Tank specialist will have accumulated, over the course of his professional life, successive bouts of working in research (and academia), working for businesses and working for governments. These special insights, produced by the crumbling of the wall between those that think and those that act, enhance the value of the services rendered by Think Tanks. They may also increase the scope of their research and the depth of their involvement with their client or beneficiary. It should also be mentioned that employing a Think Tank specialist as a decision maker or an internal employee increases the likelihood that the culture of that institution will become more welcoming of Think Tanks and more appreciative of their services and qualities, as the Think Tankers themselves are more comfortable with a multi-institutional approach.

Secondly, there is a trend, especially in the West, towards the outsourcing of certain functions towards the private sector, academia and civil society, which were previously performed internally with minimal outside input. Without passing judgement on whether this trend is, on the whole, positive or not, it suffices to note that American lobbyists are frequently employed in making initial drafts of legislation they have an interest in and that American intelligence agencies have had to rely more and more on outside counsel and workers. This last development is especially jarring, since the loyalty and the security culture of intelligence workers could generally be considered among the last things a nation would endanger through outsourcing and over-exposure, out of need or an ideological agenda. Think Tanks, even wholly independent ones, have been entrusted with higher levels of insight into government activities and agendas, with deeper roles to play in decision making and policy formulation, and with a greater allowance for initiatives in government business. Six reasons can be discerned for this outsourcing trend in the West:

- A greater emphasis on division of labor;
- The rising importance of justification of policy and reduction of uncertainty by appeal to expert authority;
- A perception of better financial outcome and accountability, which feeds into the political necessity of projecting a frugal demeanor;
- The rise of institutional (and corporate) brand power paralleling the rise of star scholars, whose image capital is especially alluring to risk adverse government officials;
- The rising complexity of world affairs requires specialized knowledge which is not often present internally in the required amount, making specialized outfits seem more attractive;
- The process of defining, promoting and maintaining a narrative in international relations and other areas requires significant engagement in terms of publishing, discussions, meetings and exchanges, as well as research. This demand has fed into the creation of more and more Think Tanks or narrowly specialized internal divisions under their umbrella, increasing the “supply” of research and argumentative services, as well as the number of providers.

Finally, Think Tanks themselves become useful as agents of their respective States or backers in the international arena, not just for developing and maintaining a narrative, but as active participants in the exchanges which must be a regular feature of communication in a multipolar and interdependent world. Being institutions separate from State, staffed with specialists and having technocratic leadership which is not subject to random political vagaries, Think Tanks have the potential for unparalleled mobility to think outside the bounds and to communicate without political pressure. A Think Tank may be invited for a collegial dialogue with (non)governmental institutions in another country, during which ideas may be exchanged, misunderstandings and controversies dispelled and proposals discreetly tested. All of this can be achieved without the preparation, publicity and symbolism of an official delegation, with on-the-record discussions and the political considerations that surface in every such circumstance. More formalized opportunities for constructive dialogue can also be arranged, such as the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies’ development of a China-Japan Think Tank Forum in 2014, when, to the world at large, the relations between the two countries were reaching a low point on account of territorial disputes.

To further illustrate this point, I would point to the decision, under China’s Partnership with the 16 Central and Eastern European Countries, to organize a yearly High Level Think Tank Symposium. During this event, the most representative Think Tanks for China and Eastern European Studies accompany MFA officials from every one of the 16 1 Initiative nations to discuss the increasingly complex issues associated with China’s multisector presencein Central and Eastern Europe, as well as related Programs, such as the “One Belt, One Road” promoted by China in the long-term. These discussions result in concrete proposals and valuable insights, which are then communicated to the respective governments. The issue of research and cooperation between Think Tanks is so pressing that there is a mechanism under the 16 1 Initiative to encourage collective projects and studies by Think Tanks in the various countries. Think Tanks are especially important for the future of the 16 1 Initiative, as various political considerations inhibit inter-governmental institutional development for enhancing the cooperation between the States involved. This leaves many coordination and knowledge issues to be solved by other types of actors, including Think Tanks. This is evident, for instance, in proposals to augment the existing mechanism for Think Tank cooperation with other networking and permanent dialogue initiatives. One such proposal is coming from the EURISC Foundation, which has developed and is promoting an idea for a two year 16 1 Think Tank Synergy program for networking and common research which would be based in Bucharest for ease of access to the region.

The examples quoted above both prove that Think Tanks have already changed in the scope of their activities and their new capacities are already being recognized and put to good use by governments. A leader in such advancements is China itself, regardless of the fact that its most well-known and effective Think Tanks are not truly non-governmental in the way that quite a number of Western Think Tanks are. Think Tanks are endowed, given purpose and utilized not just by the Chinese Central Government, but also by regional and municipal authorities.

Having only an outsider’s perspective on the issue of Chinese Think Tanks, the result of 20 years of institutional cooperation and exchanges with the China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations and a recent and brief Visiting Fellowship with the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, I can state a few observations which should be the general impression of other European observers. Firstly, China has managed to develop an impressive body of specialists and researchers within its Think Tanks. Secondly, despite the fact that the Think Tanks’ point of origin is often in a governmental department or a senior official’s initiative, China has managed to maintain an adequate separation between governmental politics and the Think Tanks’ “laboratories”. In this way, China mostly manages a best case scenario where freedom of thought, assessment and proposal on the part of Think Tanks is combined with governmental responsiveness and support, a communication of its priorities and concerns, as well as proper utilization in other roles of the specialists developed by the Think Tanks. This is especially impressive for Western and European Think Tankers who may complain that the communication of their ideas and work to the decision makers in governments is fraught with difficulties and can often resemble a Sisyphean task (the mythological Greek King who was cursed to push a boulder up a hill, only to see it roll back down hill and have to push it up again, for eternity).

In gauging the capacity of Chinese Think Tanks and their impressive openness towards International dialogue and exchanges, I am also reminded of something Chairman Yang Jiemian of the Council of Academic Affairs and former President of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, said during a visit to Romania in July 2014, at the invitation of the Romanian Diplomatic Institute. His Excellency asserted that “the tall tree catches the wind” and that China faces significant challenges in its “peaceful rise”, which it also correlates with a new “Great Power relationship”. However, China’s development in this regard is hobbled by its lack of influence and engagement with the prevailing global narratives. The best sources for formulation and support of Western narratives, but also for factual and deep criticism of these narratives, are currently Western Think Tanks, while their Chinese counterparts mostly serve the internal needs of China to make sense of the world and develop its approaches. Part of this problem and also an obvious solution is for Chinese Think Tanks to gain new stature and to engage the rest of the world in a dialogue, through their research and publications, which can eventually steer the discussion towards Chinese interests and points of view.

The voices of China’s Think Tankers are automatically given weight by China’s rise, but also by their status as specialized sources of understanding China’s complicated and rapid resumption of Great Power status. This is a priority for all countries in the world and the “business of explaining China” will guarantee prominence and readership for China’s Think Tanks, even as these institutions develop an important role in also managing aspects of China’s strategic initiatives and exchanges.  

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