- WHAT IF CLINTON WINS ——US President...
- China’s Foreign Policy under Presid...
- China’s Foreign Policy under Presid...
- The Contexts of and Roads towards t...
- Seeking for the International Relat...
- Seeking for the International Relat...
- Beyond the Strategic Deterrence Nar...
- America’s 2016 Election Risk, China...
- Three Features in China’s Diplomati...
- Three Features in China’s Diplomati...
- The Establishment of the Informal M...
- Identifying and Addressing Major Is...
- Identifying and Addressing Major Is...
- Opportunities and Challenges of Joi...
- The Establishment of the Informal M...
- Wuhan 2.0: a Chinese assessment
- The Future of China-India Relations
- Evolution of the Global Climate Gov...
- The Russia-India-China Trio in the ...
- Balancing Leadership in Regional Co...
- Coronavirus Battle in China: Proces...
- China’s Fight Against COVID-19 Epid...
- Revitalize China’s Economy:Winning ...
- International Cooperation for the C...
- Working Together with One Heart: P...
- The Tragedy of Missed Opportunities
- The Tragedy of More Missed Opportun...
- China-U.S. Collaboration --Four cas...
- Competition without Catastrophe : A...
- Lies and Truth About Data Security—...
Oct 29 2013
Domestic obstacles keep Delhi from realistic economic choices
By
The signature of the Border Defense Cooperation Agreement between China and India was hailed by Indian media as the most significant and enduring diplomatic achievement since the birth of the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement. During his recent visit to China, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh also raised issues including the trade imbalance and Sino-Pakistani ties with the Chinese side.
Compared to such accomplishments by India, China's plans of setting up industrial parks in India, promoting regional economic cooperation and the BCIM Economic Corridor were not fulfilled.
However, the specific fruits for Beijing and New Delhi do not really mean gains or losses in their respective diplomatic efforts. China and India are the two largest emerging countries, and their bilateral ties are of global strategic significance. As Singh put it, "When India and China shake hands, the world takes notice."
Diplomatic achievements, nonetheless, can reflect some underlying problems, in particular the domestic obstacles to the smooth development of Sino-Indian relations.
That Beijing was unable to realize its hopes can be attributed to some internal factors in India, including the obstacles from opposition parties, the public resistance against foreign capital, the outdated labor law institutions and the existence of established interest groups.
India has embarked on a militarist road since the defeat in the 1962 border war when security departments and related organizations developed into a vested interest group, constituting the biggest barrier preventing the Indian people from correctly reevaluating the conflicts between China and India in that year.
India has been suffering an economic slowdown in recent years. Singh did not get any substantial commitments from the US during his visit there last month, since Washington primarily intends to take advantage of its military force to contain China.
As a result, cooperation with China to develop economy has become a realistic choice for New Delhi. What's more, this corridor is pertinent to security and prosperity in northeastern India.
India's domestic concerns about the BCIM Economic Corridor mainly come from three aspects.
Given the unsettled Sino-Indian border disputes, the opening-up of the northeastern area may pose a threat to its defense security once conflicts take place.
A number of rebel groups that share ethnic ties with people in both Myanmar and China have been causing turbulence in this part of the country, and regional frictions are likely to turn into international conflicts once the district is opened up.
Further, commodities from China and some Southeast Asian nations sell well in the Indian market, which, therefore, may be occupied by foreign products amid regional economic integration.
Such worries actually expose the fact that domestic vested interest groups in India are a severe obstructing force to its social development and international economic cooperation. The opening up of the borderlands will bring about redistribution of social and economic interests, and directly lead up to the declining status of such interest groups.
The signature of the border defense cooperation may help dispel India's worries on national security, since it ensures that the two sides will not resort to force to solve border controversies by law. And economic integration will not only inject vitality to the region, but also weaken popular support for the rebels.
The only way to abate the concerns of Indian public over their market being occupied by Chinese and other nations' commodities lies in introducing advanced technologies and production, which will help increase the employment rate in India, improve its manufacturing, and boost its exports.
The mutual visits by top officials from both sides this year represent a milestone in Sino-Indian ties. High-level exchanges between the two Asian emerging powers will become institutionalized, pushing forward the bilateral relationship.
India has to overcome more domestic impediments than China. Its democracy should not become an excuse to hinder the development of its relations with Beijing.
Compared to such accomplishments by India, China's plans of setting up industrial parks in India, promoting regional economic cooperation and the BCIM Economic Corridor were not fulfilled.
However, the specific fruits for Beijing and New Delhi do not really mean gains or losses in their respective diplomatic efforts. China and India are the two largest emerging countries, and their bilateral ties are of global strategic significance. As Singh put it, "When India and China shake hands, the world takes notice."
Diplomatic achievements, nonetheless, can reflect some underlying problems, in particular the domestic obstacles to the smooth development of Sino-Indian relations.
That Beijing was unable to realize its hopes can be attributed to some internal factors in India, including the obstacles from opposition parties, the public resistance against foreign capital, the outdated labor law institutions and the existence of established interest groups.
India has embarked on a militarist road since the defeat in the 1962 border war when security departments and related organizations developed into a vested interest group, constituting the biggest barrier preventing the Indian people from correctly reevaluating the conflicts between China and India in that year.
India has been suffering an economic slowdown in recent years. Singh did not get any substantial commitments from the US during his visit there last month, since Washington primarily intends to take advantage of its military force to contain China.
As a result, cooperation with China to develop economy has become a realistic choice for New Delhi. What's more, this corridor is pertinent to security and prosperity in northeastern India.
India's domestic concerns about the BCIM Economic Corridor mainly come from three aspects.
Given the unsettled Sino-Indian border disputes, the opening-up of the northeastern area may pose a threat to its defense security once conflicts take place.
A number of rebel groups that share ethnic ties with people in both Myanmar and China have been causing turbulence in this part of the country, and regional frictions are likely to turn into international conflicts once the district is opened up.
Further, commodities from China and some Southeast Asian nations sell well in the Indian market, which, therefore, may be occupied by foreign products amid regional economic integration.
Such worries actually expose the fact that domestic vested interest groups in India are a severe obstructing force to its social development and international economic cooperation. The opening up of the borderlands will bring about redistribution of social and economic interests, and directly lead up to the declining status of such interest groups.
The signature of the border defense cooperation may help dispel India's worries on national security, since it ensures that the two sides will not resort to force to solve border controversies by law. And economic integration will not only inject vitality to the region, but also weaken popular support for the rebels.
The only way to abate the concerns of Indian public over their market being occupied by Chinese and other nations' commodities lies in introducing advanced technologies and production, which will help increase the employment rate in India, improve its manufacturing, and boost its exports.
The mutual visits by top officials from both sides this year represent a milestone in Sino-Indian ties. High-level exchanges between the two Asian emerging powers will become institutionalized, pushing forward the bilateral relationship.
India has to overcome more domestic impediments than China. Its democracy should not become an excuse to hinder the development of its relations with Beijing.
Source of documents:Global times