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Oct 28 2013
Multi-Tier China-EU Relations: Baltic Sub-Group’s Roles
By
(Mr. Edgars Rinkēvičs, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia meets with Prof. Yang Jiemian)
Second track dialogues such as the Baltic Forum are useful in reducing strategic suspicions and enhancing mutual understanding. In 2009 the Forum succeeded in inviting the then Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Ms. FU Ying as the first participant from the People’s Republic of China. In 2012 Professor QU Xing, President of the Chinese Institute of International Studies, delivered a speech entitled “The Policies of Russia, US and China and Their Implications on International Relations, ”which was well received.
I am the third Chinese that deliver a keynote speech at the Baltic Forum. On August 13, 2013 Mr. Sergejs Patapkins came to my office to invite me to join the Baltic Forum. Mr. Patapkins is an advisor to the Forum and a member of Latvian Parliament. More importantly, we have a mutual friend of the serving Chinese ambassador YANG Guoqiang to Latvia. We decided to use the Baltic Form as a platform for furthering the cooperation not only between our two countries but also between China and the Baltic region. Therefore my keynote speech topic was made as “China-Europe Relations and Their Prospects”, although many others will be talking about energy and transportation at the meeting.
As a researcher of international studies, my observations and thoughts focus on the following five issues. Number One, how effective the Forum is in the readjustment of Baltic relations with Russia. There are too many historical, both remote and recent, problems between the Baltic states and Russia. As a matter of fact, Latvia population has reduced from three million to just 2.07 million with a massive fleeing of the ethnic Russians. But as Russia’s close neighbors, the Baltic states must coexist with its Big Brother and a sub group of the three Baltic states can achieve more than if they go separately.
Number Two, how the Baltic states promote their interests and status as EU and NATO member states.In the past hundreds of years, the Baltic states were the victims of Russian/Soviet-German deals. In order to avoid a repetition of the history, the Baltic states succeeded in applying for EU membership and NATO. Memberships at the EU and NATO have benefited the Baltic states a great deal on the one hand, but on the other hand, they found that they have little voices in deciding the regional and global affairs. Actually this is a common phenomenon among the medium and small-sized countries with the European Union. In addition to the oldest sub-group of Benelux, within the EU there are Visegrad sub-group and Nordic sub-group. So far all the three sub-groups have collectively achieved than individually does.
Baltic-European relations are both a marriage of love and of convenience. The Baltic states are of the similar democratic value and preference to market economy. Integrated into the EU, the Baltic states feel safer and stronger. During the crisis in 2008, Latvia got a loan of 75 hundred million euro from the IMF and EU, which helped it out of the crisis and back to normalcy. But Latvia has to show its loyalty to the EU and NATO as well. It contributed a small contingent to Afghanistan and it voluntarily refrains from criticizing EU on major policies.
Number Three, how these Baltic states work with the United States.Compared with some European countries, Latvia has an even closer relation with the United States. As soon as I touched down at the Riga airport, I found that Latvia is one of the most Americanized and Europeanized countries among the former Soviet republics. The signs and brands remind visitors how closely the country is linked to the West. When I talked senior government officials and parliamentarians, their intertwining networking with the United States is obvious.They also hope that President Obama’s rebalancing in Asia-Pacific region will not mean the U.S. deserting from Europe and elsewhere.Moreover,many of the Latvian elites oppose containments against China and strongly argue for de-ideology in Western policies towards China.
Number Four, how to further elevate China-Baltic relations.Baltic states only have had diplomatic relations with China for about some twenty years since its independence. It takes time for both sides to build up economic, diplomatic and even security relations through pragmatic efforts and benefits. All the three Baltic states take economic development as top priority, which provides basis and larger scale of economic cooperation between China and the Baltic states. There are great potential for China-Baltic relations. For instances, according to the Statistical Office of the European Union, in the year of 2012, Latvia’s trade volume with Russia and EU are respectively as much as 777% and 1685% with China. For Lithuania, these figures are 2034% and 3287%. For Estonia, 357% and 1025%. Furthermore, the Baltic states are strengthening their relations with the Nordic countries, trying to tap fully the combined advantages of the two sub-groups. Another promising field is infrastructure. China has succeeded in promoting interconnectivities of infrastructure with some of its neighboring countries. It is worth considering for both China and the Baltic states to work on the New Silk Way as proposed by China. Latvia also hopes that China could help it to translate the military corridor to an economic one in the post-2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan by the United States and the NATO.
China-Baltic sub-group cooperation should start from but not be limited to economic ones. China and Central and Eastern Europe have already established a working mechanism, within which China and the Baltic states could cooperate in a more institutionalized way. For instance, the annual prime minister meeting is both a promoter and an implementation of their cooperation. Moreover, the Central and Eastern European countries attach great importance to their cultural and educational relations with China, thus laying a solid foundation for future and sustainable relation. Chinese medicine is another positive factor in this sub-group relation.By the Chinese and Western medical cooperation, we are adding philosophic and historical elements in the China-Baltic relations. However, there are barriers as well. Some EU people and sectors have strategic suspicions on China’s enhanced and institutional relations with certain sub-groups and they try to block them from further development.
Number Five, how three sub-group factors would impact major power relations, regional cooperation and global governance. In a broader sense, the sub-groups’ relations with China are part of major countries relations. First of all, EU has to put EU-U.S. relation on the top agenda and make EU-China relation a secondary one. This explains why the medium and small-sized member states at the EU have little voice in recognizing China’s market economy status and removing arms embargo against China.
In terms of diplomatic priority, the Baltic states put Russia much ahead of China for obvious reasons. The Baltic states has to live with Russia for many reasons:the looming historical memories, the lingering Soviet linkage, the Russian population and influence, the energy and other industrial interdependence, and military and security consideration. However, with the increasing globalization and China’s enhanced relations with the Baltic states, people’s thinking should break away from the traditional straitjacket and look into more alternatives and possibilities, one of which is to make a community of interests and destinies. China need to add these strategic thinking in communicating with the Baltic states. China’s relations with the former Soviet republics have special intricacy and sensitivity because they are still deemed as Russia’s backyards. But China and Russia should also coordinate their interaction in the former Soviet republics by making their respective and mutual interaction with these countries positive factors in promoting China-Russia strategic partnership.
Sub-regional cooperation is not new in international relations. However, the new tendency in recent years is that these sub-groups are playing a bigger role along with the larger regional and global framework.With the fast growth of member states and their diversifying demands, the regional and sub-regional cooperation are, to certain extent, remedies for the weakness and ineffectiveness of global governance. China is a major power in the world. Baltic states are small European ones. However, if they combine their efforts, both can make greater and positive contribution to the on-going transformation of international system and trends of peace, development and win-win cooperation.
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