- Liu Zongyi
- Associate Research Fellow
- Center for Asia-Pacific Studies
- Institute for International Strategic Studies
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May 07 2013
Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Their Competitive Symbiotic Relationship
By LIU Zongyi
Currently, Sino-Indian border dispute became a focus of world mass media again. A “tent confrontation” between Chinese army and Indian army took place and has been continuing near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) for these days. From Indian side, Chinese army has invaded Indian territory, and this time is “the most serious one in the past 25 years”. In fact, Indian mass media’s reports about Chinese incursions can be heard without end in recent years. It’s ridiculous that some Indian mass media asserts that Chinese invaded India for more than 600 times in the past three years.
Sino-Indian border issue is very complicated. It was left over from British Imperialist invasions of India and China. In 1960s, a military conflict ever broke out between China and India for territory. That conflict became the excuse for India to develop arms vigorously, to get ready for battle, and to make nuclear weapons. The root reason for so many “incursion” incidents that Indian sides claimed is that the both sides have not reached a consensus on the LAC after the boundary conflict in 1962. Both sides never delimit the LAC, let alone formal border. From this respect, it’s debatable to say Chinese army invaded Indian territory. However, since 1993 China and India have signed two agreements and one protocol on the maintenance of peace and tranquility and confidence-building measures in the border areas, and have set up a working mechanism for consultation and coordination on border affairs. These efforts have helped ensure durable peace and stability in the border areas. There is very small possibility that China and India will come to serious conflict.
But, the bilateral relations between China and India are very subtle. Except for boundary problem, China-Pakistan relations, Dalai Lama issue and water resources issue also hinder the promotion of China-India relations. These problems make India have a deep-seated distrust of China. Especially with the growing economic gap between China and India, some Indian are losing self-confidence gradually when they look at China. That Indian mass media and some Indian strategic scholars propagate frequently “Chinese incursion” and “China threat” is the typical performance of no confidence of them. This phenomenon does provide chances for some Western countries to divide Sino-India relations.
With the US “rebalancing” toward the Asia-Pacific, the Sino-Indian relationship is seeing subtle changes these days. Some Indian scholars trumpet an alliance under the US leadership to counterbalance China. For example, Harsh V. Pant, a professor of defense studies at King's College London, argues that India's strategic interests can only be realized by an Asia-Pacific arrangement where the US retains its predominant status, while the Indian Express columnist C. Raja Mohan advocates that India should shift its policy of strategic autonomy and strategically cooperate with the US.
So far, India has strengthened its "Look East" Policy. It has enhanced strategic and security cooperation with countries such as Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and Vietnam and has taken a high profile in the South China Sea disputes. In December 2011, the first trilateral dialogue between the US, Japan and India was presided over by the US and one of the discussion topics was China's growing military and political global position. It's no wonder many think that India may abandon strategic autonomy in order to ally with the US and contain China.
Currently, Indian policymakers have a relatively clear judgment on Sino-Indian relations and India-US relations. India doesn't have the ability to directly confront China yet, and as a country prioritizing economic development, India is in need of a peaceful neighboring environment. History shows that the US is not a reliable ally for India. Affected by the economic crisis, the US is heavily burdened by its domestic economic problems. It’s in doubt how much money can be invested in counterbalancing China. It anchors its hope on the strategy of "offshore balancing" to achieve balance with China or even contain China by stirring up tensions between China and its Asian strategic partners. It is just taking advantage of India's strength to balance China. In effect, that should kill two birds with one stone.
So, at present, we see the ironic sight of articles in both the US and Indian media trying to provoke the other side into tensions with China. The Indian media highlights that Uncle Sam is well-prepared to battle China, while the US media points out that India is engaging in military expansion in preparation for possible Sino-Indian boundary conflicts. India still maintains its status as a “swing state” in the international system. Although it has become more pro-US, India will not abandon strategic autonomy to ally with the US.
I ever published articles that argue the Sino-Indian relationship is in essence a competitive symbiotic relationship. The reasons that I call Sino-Indian relationship as “competitive symbiosis” are as following: First of all, there are really some competitions between China and India, mainly in geopolitics, trade market, and energy, etc., but that competitions are not necessarily cutthroat and zero sum. China and India can cooperate if they have mutual trust. In fact, China and India do have cooperation in many fields, such as energy and anti-terrorism.
In addition to competition, Sino-Indian symbiotic relationship can be divided into four levels: Firstly, as two big powers that rise simultaneously, China and India possess similar positions in current international system. They are beneficiaries of the current international system, but at the same time, they are constrained by this system and suppressed by the dominant power in the system. They want to improve the reform of this system gradually. So, China and India have common interests on many global issues, such as the reform of international financial system, climate change, and WTO negotiation. China, India, Brazil and South Africa have organized BRICS and BASIC, which promote the reform of international order. If China, India and other countries could not consolidate on these global issues, they would be crushed one by one by the dominant power in the system and lose chances to rise again for ever.
Secondly, in the trilateral relations of China, India and the United States, the promotion of India’s status benefits from China’s rise. China's development and rise is the prerequisite for India's rise. If India is really embroiled in conflicts with China, it's hard to say whether the US will stretch out a hand to help India. But if India surpasses China, it will definitely replace its neighbor as the target of the US.
Thirdly, as two neighboring powers in Asia, both China and India need a peaceful and stable periphery to develop their economies. Statesmen in both countries know clearly that development is the primary task for their country, and development needs stable circumstances. So, it is a common task for China and India to maintain the stability of the region. This is the determinant factor that encourages China and India to keep their border areas stable in at least 10 years.
At last, Chinese and Indian economies are complementary. Since they are in symbiosis, they could provide nutriment each other for their partner’s survival and development from aspect of theory. Sino-Indian bilateral trade developed quickly in the past ten years, and the trade volume has risen 20 fold. Although Indian complain that there are some problems in bilateral trade structure, and Indian trade deficit is too large, it’s evident that Chinese goods, which are quality and cheap, raise Indian people’s living standards. China and India have large room to cooperate, especially in infrastructure construction. China has large amounts of capital and rich experience in construction of infrastructure, while India needs to improve the construction of infrastructure facilities, but is lack of finance. Sino-Indian cooperation in this field will benefit both sides.
Within India, the so-called “China threat” is a trick of Indian political figures to pull the wool over their people and Western countries. From aspect of domestic politics, by making waves of China, Indian politicians can shift domestic contradictions, bolster up national morale, and pull votes; and military figures can get budget. From aspect of international politics, by making waves of China, India can obtain advanced weaponry and technologies from Western countries. But in fact, the major direction of Indian military expansion is Indian Ocean. Navy got the largest part of India’s rapid growing defense budget. India’s military strategy on land is defensive in nature. In the Indian Ocean, India has another competitor that is much stronger than China. The so-called “China threat” is just a cover.
The direction of Sino-Indian relations is determined in mid-term at least, but border issue is still a yoke in bilateral relations. India had some domestic reflection on Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 and Nehru’s policy towards China at that time, but no consensus was achieved. Indian government never declared to the public Henderson-Brooks report that summarized reasons why India was defeated. Coherent or similar view of history will play decisive role in the peaceful resolution of Sino-Indian border problem. It’s necessary for Indian government to uncover the trues of Sino-Indian boundary conflict to Indian people, and Chinese and Indian scholars to conduct a joint research on some historical problems, to alter both sides’ longstanding misconceptions.
Sino-Indian border issue is very complicated. It was left over from British Imperialist invasions of India and China. In 1960s, a military conflict ever broke out between China and India for territory. That conflict became the excuse for India to develop arms vigorously, to get ready for battle, and to make nuclear weapons. The root reason for so many “incursion” incidents that Indian sides claimed is that the both sides have not reached a consensus on the LAC after the boundary conflict in 1962. Both sides never delimit the LAC, let alone formal border. From this respect, it’s debatable to say Chinese army invaded Indian territory. However, since 1993 China and India have signed two agreements and one protocol on the maintenance of peace and tranquility and confidence-building measures in the border areas, and have set up a working mechanism for consultation and coordination on border affairs. These efforts have helped ensure durable peace and stability in the border areas. There is very small possibility that China and India will come to serious conflict.
But, the bilateral relations between China and India are very subtle. Except for boundary problem, China-Pakistan relations, Dalai Lama issue and water resources issue also hinder the promotion of China-India relations. These problems make India have a deep-seated distrust of China. Especially with the growing economic gap between China and India, some Indian are losing self-confidence gradually when they look at China. That Indian mass media and some Indian strategic scholars propagate frequently “Chinese incursion” and “China threat” is the typical performance of no confidence of them. This phenomenon does provide chances for some Western countries to divide Sino-India relations.
With the US “rebalancing” toward the Asia-Pacific, the Sino-Indian relationship is seeing subtle changes these days. Some Indian scholars trumpet an alliance under the US leadership to counterbalance China. For example, Harsh V. Pant, a professor of defense studies at King's College London, argues that India's strategic interests can only be realized by an Asia-Pacific arrangement where the US retains its predominant status, while the Indian Express columnist C. Raja Mohan advocates that India should shift its policy of strategic autonomy and strategically cooperate with the US.
So far, India has strengthened its "Look East" Policy. It has enhanced strategic and security cooperation with countries such as Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and Vietnam and has taken a high profile in the South China Sea disputes. In December 2011, the first trilateral dialogue between the US, Japan and India was presided over by the US and one of the discussion topics was China's growing military and political global position. It's no wonder many think that India may abandon strategic autonomy in order to ally with the US and contain China.
Currently, Indian policymakers have a relatively clear judgment on Sino-Indian relations and India-US relations. India doesn't have the ability to directly confront China yet, and as a country prioritizing economic development, India is in need of a peaceful neighboring environment. History shows that the US is not a reliable ally for India. Affected by the economic crisis, the US is heavily burdened by its domestic economic problems. It’s in doubt how much money can be invested in counterbalancing China. It anchors its hope on the strategy of "offshore balancing" to achieve balance with China or even contain China by stirring up tensions between China and its Asian strategic partners. It is just taking advantage of India's strength to balance China. In effect, that should kill two birds with one stone.
So, at present, we see the ironic sight of articles in both the US and Indian media trying to provoke the other side into tensions with China. The Indian media highlights that Uncle Sam is well-prepared to battle China, while the US media points out that India is engaging in military expansion in preparation for possible Sino-Indian boundary conflicts. India still maintains its status as a “swing state” in the international system. Although it has become more pro-US, India will not abandon strategic autonomy to ally with the US.
I ever published articles that argue the Sino-Indian relationship is in essence a competitive symbiotic relationship. The reasons that I call Sino-Indian relationship as “competitive symbiosis” are as following: First of all, there are really some competitions between China and India, mainly in geopolitics, trade market, and energy, etc., but that competitions are not necessarily cutthroat and zero sum. China and India can cooperate if they have mutual trust. In fact, China and India do have cooperation in many fields, such as energy and anti-terrorism.
In addition to competition, Sino-Indian symbiotic relationship can be divided into four levels: Firstly, as two big powers that rise simultaneously, China and India possess similar positions in current international system. They are beneficiaries of the current international system, but at the same time, they are constrained by this system and suppressed by the dominant power in the system. They want to improve the reform of this system gradually. So, China and India have common interests on many global issues, such as the reform of international financial system, climate change, and WTO negotiation. China, India, Brazil and South Africa have organized BRICS and BASIC, which promote the reform of international order. If China, India and other countries could not consolidate on these global issues, they would be crushed one by one by the dominant power in the system and lose chances to rise again for ever.
Secondly, in the trilateral relations of China, India and the United States, the promotion of India’s status benefits from China’s rise. China's development and rise is the prerequisite for India's rise. If India is really embroiled in conflicts with China, it's hard to say whether the US will stretch out a hand to help India. But if India surpasses China, it will definitely replace its neighbor as the target of the US.
Thirdly, as two neighboring powers in Asia, both China and India need a peaceful and stable periphery to develop their economies. Statesmen in both countries know clearly that development is the primary task for their country, and development needs stable circumstances. So, it is a common task for China and India to maintain the stability of the region. This is the determinant factor that encourages China and India to keep their border areas stable in at least 10 years.
At last, Chinese and Indian economies are complementary. Since they are in symbiosis, they could provide nutriment each other for their partner’s survival and development from aspect of theory. Sino-Indian bilateral trade developed quickly in the past ten years, and the trade volume has risen 20 fold. Although Indian complain that there are some problems in bilateral trade structure, and Indian trade deficit is too large, it’s evident that Chinese goods, which are quality and cheap, raise Indian people’s living standards. China and India have large room to cooperate, especially in infrastructure construction. China has large amounts of capital and rich experience in construction of infrastructure, while India needs to improve the construction of infrastructure facilities, but is lack of finance. Sino-Indian cooperation in this field will benefit both sides.
Within India, the so-called “China threat” is a trick of Indian political figures to pull the wool over their people and Western countries. From aspect of domestic politics, by making waves of China, Indian politicians can shift domestic contradictions, bolster up national morale, and pull votes; and military figures can get budget. From aspect of international politics, by making waves of China, India can obtain advanced weaponry and technologies from Western countries. But in fact, the major direction of Indian military expansion is Indian Ocean. Navy got the largest part of India’s rapid growing defense budget. India’s military strategy on land is defensive in nature. In the Indian Ocean, India has another competitor that is much stronger than China. The so-called “China threat” is just a cover.
The direction of Sino-Indian relations is determined in mid-term at least, but border issue is still a yoke in bilateral relations. India had some domestic reflection on Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 and Nehru’s policy towards China at that time, but no consensus was achieved. Indian government never declared to the public Henderson-Brooks report that summarized reasons why India was defeated. Coherent or similar view of history will play decisive role in the peaceful resolution of Sino-Indian border problem. It’s necessary for Indian government to uncover the trues of Sino-Indian boundary conflict to Indian people, and Chinese and Indian scholars to conduct a joint research on some historical problems, to alter both sides’ longstanding misconceptions.
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