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Introduction
The year 2010 sees sixty anniversary of the founding of diplomatic relations between China and India, perhaps reminding readers of the time when India was the first non-Communist country in the world to recognize the People’s Republic of China. As an important occasion, both countries plan to celebrate the anniversary by hosting a variety of activities. That could be seen as an indication that they would like to work toward better collaboration. Despite a variety of difficulties, the two sides adhere to a positive gesture as far as the future of China-India relations is concerned. There are sufficient reasons for that. Since the two countries decided to build up their bilateral relationship into “ strategic partnership for peace and prosperity ” in 2005 when Chinese premier Wen Jiabao paid a state visit toMany argue that it has been attributed to the boundary dispute that has been lasting for more than half a century, nearly as long as the diplomatic relationship. And if it is traced back to the root cause for the dispute, it has been even much longer than that because it has been attributed to the British colonial rule in
One reason is that, in retrospect, Sino-Indian ties started not really on a consensus basis. When the two countries decided to build up diplomatic ties soon after the founding of the People’s Republic of China ( PRC ), actually they had serious differences over Tibet, which China claims its integral part but India had severe debates over that claim by that time ( and even today there are still some Indians including some strategists who do not want to accept it, though the Government of India officially claimed the statement in 2003 ).
Another reason is that, according to declassified documents on Indian side, Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru once wrote to his cabinet to predict that both India and China were geopolitical powers with expansive tendency, and that would make the two nations hard to deal with each other. It was a letter dated November 18, 1950 from Nehru to Mr. Patel, then the interior minister of
Seeking common interests
The past sixty year history has presented many interesting cases about Sino-Indian relations, and they are worth reviewing with critical assessments in the context of changed situation. Realistically, it is unfair to judge the outcome of the bilateral interactions from the present viewpoints for the events that took place in a totally different situation. However, one may yet find out that common interests and how to perceive common interests between the two countries has been a crucial part of the bilateral relationship. The point is that common interests always exists but not always be found and sensed. During the critical time of Sino-Indian relations, whether the two sides could have reached consensus on common interests would play a decisive role in shaping and handling the event.In early 1950s, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai and Indian prime minister Nehru finally solved their difference over
That case illustrated that, despite severe differences, the two neighbors would clearly perceive how harmful and risky not to take care of the bilateral relations on the basis of common interests. In retrospect, Nehru finally turned down his cabinet colleagues’ argument that India should have fought with China “ to save Tibet ”, and the prime minister’s view was clearly based on his perception that maintaining collaboration with China and thus keeping the region peaceful and stable would be on India’s interests and on that of China, too.
Some events have been so debatable that analysts even perceive the risk of potential conflicts between the two countries. For instance, over the last couple of years, Indian media constantly reported what it perceived as increasing tension in the border area, and Indian army reportedly would intensify military deployment there including additional divisions being deployed in the disputed area. Contrast to the media stories, Indian government stated that the boundary area has been peaceful and stable. There is no such tension as reported by the media. It is true that the two countries are fully aware of the significance of boundary disputes, however, neither sides really wants to see the reverse of bilateral relationship downward for any single event, not even the boundary disputes that are certainly relevant to fundamental national interests. Both sides believe there are common interests to pursue, especially in the rapidly changing world, and working together to build up a new framework for the bilateral relationship would benefit the two countries when they are rising up rapidly. That is the necessity to make the 2005 decision for strategic partnership.
The rise of
It has been reflected in the Doha Round talks of WTO for the making of trade rules and also in Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009 when developing countries had to face challenges, etc.. The G20 summit mechanism that was established in the peak of the financial crisis in 2008 has provided an important opportunity to both
In the forthcoming evolution of international system, whether it is in financial institutions or in trade areas, both
In regional level, differences between the two nations change according to situations, and generally speaking, one could argue that the two nations should invest more to consult with each other over important issues in the region, that is in Asia in the first place, which is yet far from sufficient, and meanwhile, mutual suspicions resulting from different perceptions or interests should be reduced, otherwise, the two sides would find it hard to get rid of negative interactions. In fact,
For instance, India took part in founding the East Asia summit and became a member of the mechanism in 2005, though India is hardly seen as an East Asian nation from a geopolitical viewpoint; and in the same year, China was accepted as an observer to the South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation ( SAARC ), and of course, China is not a South Asian nation, either. Engagement like this, if perceived from traditional geopolitical view, might be seen as competition or struggle for geopolitical influence. However, in the rapidly changing situation, such views would look quite obsolete, and would not fit the current trend. Today’s trend shows an accelerating pace of regionalism and regional cooperation, making interdependence among states in economic, political and security areas even closer. Regional players can hardly pursue the sort of game to acquire their own interests at the expense of that of others. Despite the fact that regionalism in Asia is not as advanced as that in Europe, major players in Asia have been increasingly aware of the trend and trying to take the lead in their own region for cooperation. In this process in Asia, both
The process of building up Sino-Indian mutual trust over regional affairs is a necessary step for them to rebuild up partnership. Over the last six decades, due to constraint of geopolitical development and relevant perceptions,
To
Properly handling bilateral relations
Most important, of course, is the bilateral area that will determine what sort of Sino-Indian relationship it would look like in the future. There are numerous events taking place continuously in the bilateral area over the last six decades ranging from small events like visa disputes to large ones like border conflicts. Many events have proved that how handling bilateral relations properly is not a resolved issue. From political to economic and from cultural to non-governmental,That again shows some events highly relevant to historic experience remain as obstacle to positive development of the bilateral relationship. With all the difficulties, the development of Sino-Indian ties could prove that properly handling the bilateral relationship needs careful approaches and cautious thinking. From the very beginning after
Firstly, it is just natural and normal for the two big neighbors to have some problems, but exaggerating existing problems for whatsoever reasons could be very harmful. Starting from this, the two countries may have to take the seriousness of the problems into account and work hard to seek for solutions on the one hand, and on the other hand, the two sides must be cautious about their words and actions on the issues if the problems cannot be solved for the moment. Stirring up emotional response and trying to irritate public opinion to arise political pressure on the government would be very bad option.
Take the boundary dispute as example. In the line with all the historic experiences, one may conclude that, if the issue is unresolved for whatever reasons, the possible option could be shelving it aside. Though it may not be the best option, it could have its rational if existing conditions do not allow for a final settlement over such difficult issues. The rational lies in the fact that peace and stability in Sino-Indian boundary areas have been maintained for a long time, and it would continue as such. There is no reason why it cannot, because the two sides have very strong political will that force never be used. On that basis, the two sides are working on a mutually acceptable formula for final settlement. If not, there is no need for either side trying to blame the other side, and as long as peace and stability is maintained in the areas, the two countries do not have to concentrate too much on the issue. If it cannot be solved, why not just leave it aside?
The past experience shows that the two sides could move the bilateral relationship ahead even without great progress on the boundary negotiation. It means that jointly working on other areas for promoting the bilateral relationship does not rely on the settlement of the disputes, though solving them would be better. Apparently, there are also other important things to do. Meanwhile, any ungrounded stimulation with the issues or unilateral measures in name of prevention would only complicate the disputes further indeed. Importantly, the two sides have managed to build up necessary framework, which consists of a couple of useful treaties and agreements to safeguard the tranquility and stability of the border areas, and also to enhance confidence building measures between the two armies around the Line of Actual Control. Above all, the special representative dialogue mechanism which was established in 2003 has played crucial role in consensus building efforts by both sides. As a result, the first agreement on political principles for boundary settlement was reached in 2005. All these measures and achievements that have been made are aimed at conflict prevention and stability maintenance. There are reasons to take the faith that tranquility and stability would continue to be maintained even if final settlement over the boundary disputes is still remote.
Secondly, normal state-to-state relations must include many aspects, and there is no one single issue that should determine all the other aspects. Since 2003, with the care of the two leaderships, Sino-Indian relations have witnessed enormous progress in economic and trade areas. The bilateral trade volume starting from roughly about 3 billion USD in 2002 jumped to nearly 50 billion USD in 2008. In terms of goods trading,
It is true that Sino-Indian trade relations have some problems such as India’s anti-damping cases, majority of which focus on Chinese goods to India, and the trade is yet not balanced, but that is a reflection of the nature of exports and imports between the two and different advantages by the two countries, not necessarily an exclusive feature of Sino-Indian trade. It is actually a new phenomenon when
Regarding current disputes in trading areas, both sides believe that effective measures must be taken and proper solutions to the existing problems could be found on the basis that both sides can bring their respective advantages into play. It is not impossible that developing powers like
Finally, people to people contact remains as a most imperative issue for the two countries to pay good attention to, because the status quo is neither satisfactory nor sufficient. As the purpose of people to people contact is to stimulate public interest in and curiosity for the other people and their culture, it is necessary to delink such contacts with political aims. In other words, exchanges between peoples should not in the first place be designed with political purpose as if they only serve for political goals. Rather, people to people contacts are cultural expressions in different contexts. They could be the outcome of political development, but not necessarily constrained to it. When Xuanzang, the ancient Chinese monk, went to
Conclusion
The two great civilizations must have the wisdom to avoid falling into the trap of mutual hatred only because of some temporary differences. There is no doubt that current Sino-Indian relations are not as good as expected, but that does not mean that the two sides should only have hostility or rivalry against each other. As a matter of fact, what is known as geopolitical rivalry between
Zhao Gancheng, senior fellow & Director, Center for South Asia Studies, Shanghai Insititute for International Studies.
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