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Sep 19 2011
China and South Asia: Looking Ahead
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Introduction

The year 2010 sees sixty anniversary of the founding of diplomatic relations between China and India, perhaps reminding readers of the time when India was the first non-Communist country in the world to recognize the People’s Republic of China. As an important occasion, both countries plan to celebrate the anniversary by hosting a variety of activities. That could be seen as an indication that they would like to work toward better collaboration. Despite a variety of difficulties, the two sides adhere to a positive gesture as far as the future of China-India relations is concerned. There are sufficient reasons for that. Since the two countries decided to build up their bilateral relationship into “ strategic partnership for peace and prosperity ” in 2005 when Chinese premier Wen Jiabao paid a state visit to India, many events have taken place in all levels. There are lots of positive development indeed such as fast growth of bilateral trade and increasing flow of mutual visits between the two peoples, and cultural exchanges have been seen as one of the potentials to promote the bilateral relations. However, it is undeniable that negative elements have come up, too, making the bilateral relationship appear somewhat difficult, especially in security and political arena. 

Many argue that it has been attributed to the boundary dispute that has been lasting for more than half a century, nearly as long as the diplomatic relationship. And if it is traced back to the root cause for the dispute, it has been even much longer than that because it has been attributed to the British colonial rule in India, at least from Chinese viewpoint about it. And yet others argue that Sino-Indian relations have gone much beyond the boundary issue because they are the two rising powers, meaning that fierce competition between the two is going to be a normal status and even s dominant element, leading to unpredictable outcome. Given both the circumstance and possible prospect of Sino-Indian relations, it is now time to rethink of the bilateral relationship on the occasion of 60 anniversary of their diplomatic ties. There are two reasons for this.

One reason is that, in retrospect, Sino-Indian ties started not really on a consensus basis. When the two countries decided to build up diplomatic ties soon after the founding of the People’s Republic of China ( PRC ), actually they had serious differences over Tibet, which China claims its integral part but India had severe debates over that claim by that time ( and even today there are still some Indians including some strategists who do not want to accept it, though the Government of India officially claimed the statement in 2003 ). India’s self-perception that India had a special relationship with Tibetan region and the fact that India did not recognize China’s sovereignty over Tibet almost triggered off a crisis between the two nations. But the following negotiations and compromise finally paved the way for the two nations to work together for a new formula to deal with their relations, which was later known as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.   That case could be enlightening to both sides to think of their current relationship. Now that 60 years passed, there must be lots of lessons and experiences for both sides to learn about.

Another reason is that, according to declassified documents on Indian side, Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru once wrote to his cabinet to predict that both India and China were geopolitical powers with expansive tendency, and that would make the two nations hard to deal with each other. It was a letter dated November 18, 1950 from Nehru to Mr. Patel, then the interior minister of India. The later events and conflicts seem to have proved Nehru’s prediction. Even though we do not intend to depict Nehru as a prophet, the case does show that the two Asian giants have to move ahead on the awareness of common interests between them, otherwise, difference could prevail, even leading to conflicts. Starting from this point, this article tries to rethink of the possibility of building up Sino-Indian partnership, especially in a rapidly changing world.

Seeking common interests

The past sixty year history has presented many interesting cases about Sino-Indian relations, and they are worth reviewing with critical assessments in the context of changed situation. Realistically, it is unfair to judge the outcome of the bilateral interactions from the present viewpoints for the events that took place in a totally different situation. However, one may yet find out that common interests and how to perceive common interests between the two countries has been a crucial part of the bilateral relationship. The point is that common interests always exists but not always be found and sensed. During the critical time of Sino-Indian relations, whether the two sides could have reached consensus on common interests would play a decisive role in shaping and handling the event. 

In early 1950s, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai and Indian prime minister Nehru finally solved their difference over Tibet, and a treaty about India’s trade with the Tibetan region including India’s proper presence in Lhasa and elsewhere in Tibet was successfully reached. In April 1954, Zhou Enlai paid his first visit to New Delhi. Having taken good talks and negotiations, the two leaders then issued the joint statement in which the well-known Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were proposed. Apparently, neither the treaty nor the joint statement means that the two sides did not have difference over Tibet, but the fact that the two sides could have reached them did mean that common interests as well as clear awareness of it by the two leaderships prevailed. 

That case illustrated that, despite severe differences, the two neighbors would clearly perceive how harmful and risky not to take care of the bilateral relations on the basis of common interests. In retrospect, Nehru finally turned down his cabinet colleagues’ argument that India should have fought with China “ to save Tibet ”, and the prime minister’s view was clearly based on his perception that maintaining collaboration with China and thus keeping the region peaceful and stable would be on India’s interests and on that of China, too. India could not “ save Tibet ”, and more importantly, India and China would have to learn how to live together peacefully. That was precisely the common interests of the two countries. It was this awareness that made the two countries reach a real rapprochement in nearly whole 1950s until the boundary dispute became acute. 
Chinese premier Wen Jiabao’s state visit to India in April 2005 is another case to illustrate Sino-Indian common interests. During the visit, both sides determined to upgrade the bilateral relationship into “ strategic partnership for peace and prosperity ”. Even though many observers did not believe that the two nations would be able to handle their relations so beautifully, that declaration marked a significant moment and became the peak of Sino-Indian relations in recent years. Since then, there have been events. Some have shown the positive trend to a new direction, and other events have yet revealed some negative signs such as ungrounded stories from media about what happened in the border areas, and even in economic exchanges and trade which is seen as most positive area in Sino-Indian relations, there have been situations such as China’s complaints about what is known as India’s blocks and barriers to Chinese companies’ business and operation in India. 

Some events have been so debatable that analysts even perceive the risk of potential conflicts between the two countries. For instance, over the last couple of years, Indian media constantly reported what it perceived as increasing tension in the border area, and Indian army reportedly would intensify military deployment there including additional divisions being deployed in the disputed area. Contrast to the media stories, Indian government stated that the boundary area has been peaceful and stable. There is no such tension as reported by the media. It is true that the two countries are fully aware of the significance of boundary disputes, however, neither sides really wants to see the reverse of bilateral relationship downward for any single event, not even the boundary disputes that are certainly relevant to fundamental national interests. Both sides believe there are common interests to pursue, especially in the rapidly changing world, and working together to build up a new framework for the bilateral relationship would benefit the two countries when they are rising up rapidly. That is the necessity to make the 2005 decision for strategic partnership.

The rise of China and India is actually a global issue, which would make the two nations think of the bilateral relationship in a broader context. China and India, both as developing countries, have lot in common in terms of their development stage, international status and attitudes toward international system, etc. In today’s world, one of the most important things is the collective rise of some developing powers, and they are trying to enhance their position vis-à-vis that of developed countries in the international system. And whether they can do so in a large part will depend on how they handle the relationship among themselves, because if they fail to build up consensus for cooperation between them, their position relative to developed countries would unlikely get improved. That cannot be what the developing powers want to see, and perhaps the present dominant powers would welcome it. Viewing Sino-Indian relations from this point, since they are representative in the rising powers, their relationship both at present and in the future will thus affect the evolution of the international system in general, and whether they cooperate will impose impact on the direction of systemic development. 

It has been reflected in the Doha Round talks of WTO for the making of trade rules and also in Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009 when developing countries had to face challenges, etc.. The G20 summit mechanism that was established in the peak of the financial crisis in 2008 has provided an important opportunity to both China and India to develop collaboration in international institutions, too, and obviously, such collaboration has now spread to the process of global financial reforms. In fact, the leaders of the two countries have reiterated on many occasions that the two nations share lots of common interests in many regards on global affairs, whether it is a multilateral occasion like the Brics summits ( Brazil, Russia, India and China ) or China-Russia-India trilateral summits. It is worth pointing out that even those who have suspicion on Sino-Indian partnership tend to agree that the two nations do have common interests in global stage. That points to the nature and position of the two nations in the international system, in which they face similar kinds of challenges. 

In the forthcoming evolution of international system, whether it is in financial institutions or in trade areas, both China and India would have the needs and conditions for more cooperation. Judging from the latest changes of the IMF about drawing rights and weighted voting of members, the fact that both China and India have got substantial increase ( China up to 4.42% from 2.77%, and India up to 2.91% from 2.77% ) reflects this trend. In other global issues like climate change and international response, China and India have jointly developed sort of consensus, which was reflected at the Copenhagen Summit in 2009, and Indian media applauded the event as “ the most positive development for Indian-Chinese relations ,” which was quoted by the Chinese newspaper as well ( Global Times, Dec. 22, 2009, Beijing ), reflecting a general mood on the side of public opinion. ,

In regional level, differences between the two nations change according to situations, and generally speaking, one could argue that the two nations should invest more to consult with each other over important issues in the region, that is in Asia in the first place, which is yet far from sufficient, and meanwhile, mutual suspicions resulting from different perceptions or interests should be reduced, otherwise, the two sides would find it hard to get rid of negative interactions. In fact, China and India may not have genuine conflicts of interests in either South Asia or East Asia, the two major areas of Asia. Although there are remaining problems left over from the Cold War that are awaiting solutions in these areas and that could lead to crises in certain conditions, the true picture is that, neither China’s participation in South Asia nor India’s engagement in East Asia really sees the other side’s legitimate interests as the obstacle to their own progress in the areas. On the contrary, thanks to rapid growth and enhanced political status of the two countries, their influence has increased in regional affairs to a large extent, and their participation in regional development has played a critical role. 

For instance, India took part in founding the East Asia summit and became a member of the mechanism in 2005, though India is hardly seen as an East Asian nation from a geopolitical viewpoint; and in the same year, China was accepted as an observer to the South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation ( SAARC ), and of course, China is not a South Asian nation, either. Engagement like this, if perceived from traditional geopolitical view, might be seen as competition or struggle for geopolitical influence. However, in the rapidly changing situation, such views would look quite obsolete, and would not fit the current trend. Today’s trend shows an accelerating pace of regionalism and regional cooperation, making interdependence among states in economic, political and security areas even closer. Regional players can hardly pursue the sort of game to acquire their own interests at the expense of that of others. Despite the fact that regionalism in Asia is not as advanced as that in Europe, major players in Asia have been increasingly aware of the trend and trying to take the lead in their own region for cooperation. In this process in Asia, both China and India have an indispensable role to play, and therefore, both sides need to rethink of right approaches and behaviors in order to get rid of zero-sum mentality.

The process of building up Sino-Indian mutual trust over regional affairs is a necessary step for them to rebuild up partnership. Over the last six decades, due to constraint of geopolitical development and relevant perceptions, China and India have failed in building up necessary mutual trust on regional affairs, especially on South Asian affairs. Meanwhile, the historic legacy and problems left over from the Cold War in the region have not yet been resolved. To India, some of the issues could have been even worse. That makes India quite concerned about what possible role China could play today in the region. For example, during President Obama’s visit to China in November 2009, China and the U.S. issued a joint statement in which the two sides stressed a determination to promote peace and stability in South Asia. That statement was questioned by New Delhi, and India showed its complaints about what is known as “ the outside force to intervene South Asian affairs.“. India clearly stated it would not accept any involvement from the outside in the region. Most observers believe India’s complaint meant China. In the end, Chinese foreign ministry had to issue a statement to explain that China did not have any intention to do it. That sort of events would come up frequently, showing that the two sides do not have mutual trust over regional affairs. 

To China, today’s South Asia is very different from the South Asia during the Cold War. What China wants to see there is a stable and peaceful South Asia, not such a region as it was in the past when India and Pakistan were in tension and conflicts. The reason is quite simple: a stable and peaceful South Asia is in China’s fundamental interests, and the most important interests of China in this regard may be the stability in its border areas. By the same token, it is also hard to believe that a stable and peaceful periphery is not one of the most important interests to India. That situation paves the way for the two nations to enhance communications and increase mutual trust in South Asia and in Asia at large so that more confidence of both sides could be established. And it is precisely in this area that the two sides actually share much common interests, but it is not easily perceived. The last decade witnessed many cases indeed.

Properly handling bilateral relations

Most important, of course, is the bilateral area that will determine what sort of Sino-Indian relationship it would look like in the future. There are numerous events taking place continuously in the bilateral area over the last six decades ranging from small events like visa disputes to large ones like border conflicts. Many events have proved that how handling bilateral relations properly is not a resolved issue. From political to economic and from cultural to non-governmental, China and India, as two big neighbors, have enormous contacts, and naturally, there are differences and disputes. The fact that unresolved boundary issue becomes the core problem between the two nations is the outcome of both historic perspetion and realpolitik thinking. There is no way to turn around and escape away from the trouble. And also, the Dalai Lama is “ India’s honorable guest ” ( the word of Indian prime minister and foreign minister ). Over the years, the Dalai Lama issue constantly becomes a provocative problem between China and India. On August 10, 2010, prime minister Singh officially met with him, and before that, foreign secretary Roy went to Dhalamsara to talk to the Dalai Lama.  Having read the story from the media coverage, the Chinese public would wonder what was all about behind these events, and what it would imply to Sino-Indian relations. Most Chinese know that the Government of India has a commitment to China over the Dalai Lama and his followers living in India that they not do political activities against China on India’s soil. And yet most Chinese would also understand that such formal and official meetings themselves would have significant political implications. 

That again shows some events highly relevant to historic experience remain as obstacle to positive development of the bilateral relationship. With all the difficulties, the development of Sino-Indian ties could prove that properly handling the bilateral relationship needs careful approaches and cautious thinking. From the very beginning after India’s independence and the founding of PRC, the two sides started addressing problems and then tried to build up a mutual understanding, a formula that is already familiar to analysts. For instance, the Chinese army’s peaceful deployment in Tibet in early 1950s was interpreted in New Delhi as a threat to Indian national security. That debate led Chinese premier Zhou Enlai and Indian prime minister Nehru to intensive discussions and negotiations, finally reaching an agreement on India’s linkage to China’s Tibet, that lay the foundation for a great development of the bilateral relationship in the years to come. Historic experience like this tells something about how to perceive and promote Sino-Indian relations.

Firstly, it is just natural and normal for the two big neighbors to have some problems, but exaggerating existing problems for whatsoever reasons could be very harmful. Starting from this, the two countries may have to take the seriousness of the problems into account and work hard to seek for solutions on the one hand, and on the other hand, the two sides must be cautious about their words and actions on the issues if the problems cannot be solved for the moment. Stirring up emotional response and trying to irritate public opinion to arise political pressure on the government would be very bad option. 

Take the boundary dispute as example. In the line with all the historic experiences, one may conclude that, if the issue is unresolved for whatever reasons, the possible option could be shelving it aside. Though it may not be the best option, it could have its rational if existing conditions do not allow for a final settlement over such difficult issues. The rational lies in the fact that peace and stability in Sino-Indian boundary areas have been maintained for a long time, and it would continue as such. There is no reason why it cannot, because the two sides have very strong political will that force never be used. On that basis, the two sides are working on a mutually acceptable formula for final settlement. If not, there is no need for either side trying to blame the other side, and as long as peace and stability is maintained in the areas, the two countries do not have to concentrate too much on the issue. If it cannot be solved, why not just leave it aside? 

The past experience shows that the two sides could move the bilateral relationship ahead even without great progress on the boundary negotiation. It means that jointly working on other areas for promoting the bilateral relationship does not rely on the settlement of the disputes, though solving them would be better. Apparently, there are also other important things to do. Meanwhile, any ungrounded stimulation with the issues or unilateral measures in name of prevention would only complicate the disputes further indeed. Importantly, the two sides have managed to build up necessary framework, which consists of a couple of useful treaties and agreements to safeguard the tranquility and stability of the border areas, and also to enhance confidence building measures between the two armies around the Line of Actual Control. Above all, the special representative dialogue mechanism which was established in 2003 has played crucial role in consensus building efforts by both sides. As a result, the first agreement on political principles for boundary settlement was reached in 2005. All these measures and achievements that have been made are aimed at conflict prevention and stability maintenance. There are reasons to take the faith that tranquility and stability would continue to be maintained even if final settlement over the boundary disputes is still remote.

Secondly, normal state-to-state relations must include many aspects, and there is no one single issue that should determine all the other aspects. Since 2003, with the care of the two leaderships, Sino-Indian relations have witnessed enormous progress in economic and trade areas. The bilateral trade volume starting from roughly about 3 billion USD in 2002 jumped to nearly 50 billion USD in 2008. In terms of goods trading, China has become India’s largest trade partner. Although 2009 may have seen some decline due to the international finance crisis, all the analyses have pointed out the potentials the bilateral trade does have, that has given the two leaderships more confidence. In January 2008 when Indian prime minister Mamonhan Singh visited Beijing, he stressed at one of his speeches that the world would have sufficient space for both India and China to develop together. That statement interpreted the supplementary nature of Sino-Indian relations in economic terms very well. And there is no doubt that his argument includes political implication, too. 

It is true that Sino-Indian trade relations have some problems such as India’s anti-damping cases, majority of which focus on Chinese goods to India, and the trade is yet not balanced, but that is a reflection of the nature of exports and imports between the two and different advantages by the two countries, not necessarily an exclusive feature of Sino-Indian trade. It is actually a new phenomenon when China becomes the largest trading state in the world. There are recent cases showing that national security is a reason to be implied to China’s IT companies that operate in India. Some Chinese analysts complain that political factors are increasing in China-India business exchanges. But that is not the mainstream. Further, it is not necessary to add political factors to the bilateral trading disputes particularly, and even less necessary to try to connect them with historic legacy or the unresolved boundary disputes. On the other hand, the bilateral trading relations have also witnessed new growth points. For instance, in addition to software development, Indian industries enjoy special advantages in pharmacy, jewelry design and processing and so on. The Chinese market can provide enormous potentials for Indian industries, too. 

Regarding current disputes in trading areas, both sides believe that effective measures must be taken and proper solutions to the existing problems could be found on the basis that both sides can bring their respective advantages into play. It is not impossible that developing powers like China and India may take the lead to find out new approaches for a more balanced economic development when developed countries still have deep worries about unbalanced issues.

Finally, people to people contact remains as a most imperative issue for the two countries to pay good attention to, because the status quo is neither satisfactory nor sufficient. As the purpose of people to people contact is to stimulate public interest in and curiosity for the other people and their culture, it is necessary to delink such contacts with political aims. In other words, exchanges between peoples should not in the first place be designed with political purpose as if they only serve for political goals. Rather, people to people contacts are cultural expressions in different contexts. They could be the outcome of political development, but not necessarily constrained to it. When Xuanzang, the ancient Chinese monk, went to India thousand years ago and stayed in Nalanda for studying and lecturing on Buddhism for decades, he did not work for the purpose of promoting Sino-Indian relations, but his achievements erected a great monument in the history of the bilateral relations. In the 1920s, the great Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore came to China and made many friends with Chinese intellectual elite. We still can imagine the moving picture of the great moment through the works of Chinese authors. These interactions may not have been conducted for the purpose of developing Sino-Indian ties, and India was then still under the British colonial rule, but it is an excellent example of Sino-Indian cultural exchanges.   This is what people must pursue in today’s world with more open-minded mentality. 

Conclusion

The two great civilizations must have the wisdom to avoid falling into the trap of mutual hatred only because of some temporary differences. There is no doubt that current Sino-Indian relations are not as good as expected, but that does not mean that the two sides should only have hostility or rivalry against each other. As a matter of fact, what is known as geopolitical rivalry between China and India that has been discussed heatedly by western scholars is not really popular among the public of the two countries. Ordinary people of the two nations may find it hard to understand why to interpret Sino-Indian ties so complicatedly, and whether such interpretation contains something that is hidden from the public? Questions like this would have to be left for western analysts. And Sino-Indian decision-makers and the public as well should have the confidence and wisdom to work for a new prospect of the bilateral relationship when they celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of their diplomatic ties. What they are celebrating is the future of the two great nations that will help build up a new structure of the world system. But before that, the two nations have to work out a political consensus that should help build up a feasible and workable framework in which the bilateral relationship could develop toward a positive direction in long run. That mission is yet to be achieved. 

Zhao Gancheng, senior fellow & Director, Center for South Asia Studies, Shanghai Insititute for International Studies.


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