Since the birth of nuclear weapons, the international community has been exploring how to manage and control this powerful yet destructive technology, and has reached a certain consensus on this matter. First, nuclear energy is a scientific progress in general; it can contribute to the well-being of mankind if used properly. Therefore, the international community does not prohibit developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which is encouraged instead. Second, besides civilian purposes, nuclear energy can also be used for military purposes. Military use of nuclear energy poses a threat to international peace and security and should be controlled whatsoever. For this reason, non-nuclear-weapon states (countries that did not manufacture and explode a nuclear weapon or other nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967) are required to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons. Third, as non-nuclear weapon states have waived their right to develop nuclear weapons, the NPT commits nuclear-weapon states to help non-nuclear-weapon states develop civilian nuclear energy industries. Furthermore, nuclear-weapon states should pursue negotiations in good faith on measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

Based on the above understanding, the international community has been building a system over the past few decades to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT is a cornerstone of the regime; it denies the legitimacy of acquiring nuclear weapons, and has set up a framework for nuclear non-proliferation. The NPT requires non-nuclear-weapon states to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all source or special fissionable materials for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to making nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In addition, various mechanisms for international nuclear export control have been formed, for example, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement, in order to prevent nuclear materials, nuclear technology, related equipment and other sensitive items from falling into wrong hands.

With these mechanisms, the spread of nuclear weapons was over a period. At the end of the cold war, only five countries were publicly known to have nuclear weapons. After 1990, however, non-proliferation efforts were thwarted in South Asia, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia. The situation may be attributed to the following three aspects. First, the collapse of the bipolar system had removed restraints from some regions and countries. Changes in the regional security prompted some countries seeking nuclear power. Second, after decades of development, the know-how of nuclear technology is hardly a secret, hence more countries have the ability to develop nuclear weapons. Third, as the world economy grows increasingly globalized, non-state actors become more involved in global affairs, but some of the negative forces, such as terrorists and their organizations have become a new source for nuclear proliferation.

With significant changes in the international structure and the development of science and technology, the global nuclear security governance exposes some short-boards. In particular, the control of non-state actors is at all beyond the initial design of the existing mechanism for global nuclear security governance, and becomes the most vulnerable and uncertain link of the global non-proliferation system. Therefore, Since the onset of the 21st century, the call for amendment and improvement of the mechanism has been ever growing. Obama administration put forward the idea of “nuclear security summit” in 2009, which is a repercussion to a degree to the international call.

“The nuclear security summit” is generally designed to strictly control nuclear materials for making nuclear weapons. Since principles of nuclear science is popularized and international actors are pluralized, cutting off supply of nuclear materials is like taking away the firewood from under cauldron, an effective way of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons. The theoretical vision of “the nuclear security summit” is indeed professional though, its practical efficiency should not be overestimated. First of all, the U.S. goal of “the nuclear summit” is to secure vulnerable nuclear materials in four years and is automatically extended to eight years as Obama was reelected in 2012. But, what will be eight years later? Obama did put forward the idea of “global framework” though, its practical construction is fairly uncertain. Secondly, “the nuclear security summit” strictly confined its agenda to the control of nuclear materials and preventing nuclear terrorism, deliberately bypassing the hot-spot issues of Iran’s nuke and Korea’s nuke issues, which provided little help to the international community in dealing with the issues. Third, Obama did little in strengthening other global multilateral mechanisms of nuclear non-proliferation. Obama administration failed to raise the ratification issue of Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to the U.S. senate. Moreover, Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty negotiation has yet to be started and Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons failed for the first time to reach an agreement on the draft of Final Document.

President Obama will be highly appreciated for his idea of “nuclear free world” and “nuclear security summit” when he is leaving office in 2016, but regretably, no substantial progress has been made by America in the past eight years regarding the improvement of global nuclear security governance, demonstrating that the U.S. role is declining in mobilizing the international community on global nuclear security. Thus, international community needs new ideas, new dynamics and new consensus in respect of global nuclear security governance.

First, “great power dominance” as a pattern in global nuclear security governance mechanism should be replaced by a more balanced, more democratic management. Great changes have taken place in the theme of the times and the global configuration of power. Non-nuclear countries and developing countries are taking a greater role in the global nuclear affairs. Therefore, nuclear states should pay greater attention to, and draw on, those representative opinions of the non-nuclear countries, which may provide agendas of global nuclear security governance with stronger consensus.

Second, development issue should be attached with greater importance on the agenda of global nuclear security governance. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is of importance to international peace and security, but it should not be used as the pretext to prevent developing countries from peaceful use of nuclear energy. International community should make further efforts to safeguard nuclear security that will help to lower the risk of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Hence, it is very important to upgrade the standing of the development agenda in regard of global nuclear security governance.

Third, the global nuclear security governance must be linked up with regional nuclear security governance. Global nuclear security is not free from regional security. China as an important country in the East Asia region should share not only a global vision, but also a regional looking. China must make greater effort in creating a more reliable environment of nuclear security governance in East Asia.

In sum, on both the global level and the regional level, the current nuclear security governance is challenged with many requirements of improvement. China shall actively participate in this process in putting forward Chinese proposals, which will create a safer environment for the people of China and of the world.

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