- Yan Anlin
- Senior Research Fellow
- Institute for Taiwan, Hongkong & Macao Studies
- China’s Foreign Policy under Presid...
- Seeking for the International Relat...
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- Three Features in China’s Diplomati...
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- Leading the Global Race to Zero Emi...
- China's Global Strategy(2013-2023)
- Co-exploring and Co-evolving:Constr...
- 2013 Annual report
- The Future of U.S.-China Relations ...
- “The Middle East at the Strategic C...
- 2014 Annual report
- Rebalancing Global Economic Governa...
- Exploring Avenues for China-U.S. Co...
- A CIVIL PERSPECTIVE ON CHINA'S AID ...
I. The principles of Ma’s cross-Strait policy in his second term
The past election season witnessed a sharp discrepancy between the pan-Blue and pan-Green coalitions on whether to recognize the “1992 Consensus.” Ma’s successful reelection proves that his maintenance of the “1992 Consensus” has been endorsed by the public. Therefore, we can expect Ma’s cross-Strait policy in his upcoming term to feature three continuations: first, the continuation of the policy to promote peaceful reconciliation across the Taiwan Strait; second, the continuation of “no negotiation on reunification, no seeking independence, and no use of force” across the strait; and third, the continuation of enhancing the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations while emphasizing “one China, different interpretations.” In essence, Ma’s second term will focus on consolidating the peace across the Strait that he established during his first-term.
II. Possible trends of Ma’s cross-Strait policy
First, Ma will continue to enhance cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation on the basis of the ECFA signed in 2010, so that Taiwan can better cope with the ongoing global economic crisis and increase participation in East Asia economic cooperation.
Second,Ma will likely maintain the principle of “economics first, education and culture next, and then politics.” The negotiation of the four follow-up agreements of the ECFA on investment protection, goods trade, service trade and dispute resolution mechanisms will be prioritized .An educational agreement may be signed, though considerable additional effort is likely needed before a cultural agreement is reached.
Third,, Ma’s team might start preparing for political discussions with the Mainland, and major think tanks across the Strait may also discuss issues regarding a peace agreement.
Whether such issues can be put on the SEF-ARATS negotiation table and a peace agreement can be reached depend on the resolution of Ma’s team, the development of cross-Strait relations, and the reactions of the international society.
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